Response to "Responses to Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Nathan Nobis's "Are Embryos 'Babies' and Children'?""

Some anonymous person - a "Golprey Predork" - wrote a reply to a recent short article of mine "Are embryos 'babies' and 'children'?" that I just saw yesterday. I will reply to this reply below, pasting his text in here. My responses are in the text, for efficiency:

Responses to Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Nathan Nobis's "Are Embryos 'Babies' and Children'?"

December 04, 2024

The American Journal of Bioethics Blog recently published a post by Nathan Nobis entitled "Are Embryos 'Babies' and Children'?" The following responds to sections, 1, 2, and 3.

Response to Section 1

In section 1, Nobis argues for two claims. First, he argues that people might use words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses. Second, he argues that pro-abortion activists don’t have to agree with anti-abortion activists who say that words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ should be used literally for embryos and early fetuses.

The argument for the first claim—people might use words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses—is that people use terms like ‘bean,’ ‘bun,’ and ‘bunny’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses. So, they might also use ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses.

This is good as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go very far. 

NN: yes, of course: these terms might have non-literal meaning, like many others. 

First, this argument doesn’t establish that people are using words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses. It merely establishes that they might be. Moreover, even if people are using ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for embryos and early fetuses, this argument doesn’t establish that embryos and early fetuses aren’t babies and children. Much more is needed for that.  

NN: again, of course: these terms might have non-literal meaning, like many others. 

Second, the anti-abortion activist may acknowledge that it’s perfectly fine for anyone to use ‘baby’ and ‘child’ as non-literal terms of endearment for their own embryo or early fetus. People may use language however they want. But must everyone agree that ‘baby’ and ‘child’ are mere terms of endearment when used for embryos and early fetuses? Must they agree that ‘baby’ and ‘child’ can’t be used literally for embryos and early fetuses? No. 

The argument for the second claim—pro-abortion activists don’t have to agree with anti-abortion activists who say that words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ should be used literally for embryos and early fetuses—is that, since people agree that it’s generally wrong to kill babies and children, anti-abortion activists are begging the question by assuming that embryos and early fetuses are wrong to kill when they call them ‘babies’ and ‘children.’ 

Unfortunately, this argument isn’t even good as far as it goes. 

The problem is with Nobis’s understanding of begging the question. Nobis seems to think an argument begs the question when someone would reject one of its premises. 

NN: no, that isn't said or suggested at all. Here's an argument:

1. All men are billionaires.
2. Elon is a man.
3. Therefore, Elon is a billionaire.

We would reject premise 1, but this argument is not "question-begging." I say nothing like that: anyone who think I does misunderstands what's said.

This is a bad understanding of the fallacy. A better understanding is to say an argument begs the question only when the argument’s conclusion is used as a reason to believe one of its premises. However, anti-abortion activists don’t use the claim that embryos and early fetuses are wrong to kill as a reason to believe that embryos and early fetuses are babies or children. 

NN: yes, of course: that's not what they say: they say the reverse, that since embryos and early fetuses are babies or children that is why embryos and early fetuses are wrong to kill. 

They also don’t use it as a reason to believe that it’s generally wrong to kill babies and children. 

NN: yes, of course: they do not claim that "it’s generally wrong to kill babies and children" because "embryos and early fetuses are wrong to kill." Nobody would say that. 

The big picture point is this: 

babies and children are wrong to kill. In calling embryos "babies" and "children," one is effectively describing them as wrong to kill. And so, in calling embryos "babies" and "children," one is effectively assuming that they are wrong to kill. Insofar as the claim that embryos are babies or children is supposed to be a reason to think that killing embryos is wrong, one is basically saying that embryos are wrong to kill because they are wrong to kill. That's not great reasoning. 

So, the accusation that the anti-abortion activist is guilty of begging the question does not hold up. 

Nobis may complain that this misrepresents his position. After all, he explicitly defines begging the question as “assuming what needs to be argued for.” 

NN: I think you need to think about the context. If someone "argues" "p because, well, p" responding "you are assuming what needs to be argued for" makes perfect sense and is appropriate. 

But it’s unclear what he means by this. He might mean the argument is circular—it uses its conclusion to justify one of its premises. This is suggested when he says, “when anti-abortion activists call embryos and beginning fetus ‘babies’ and ‘children,’ they are typically just assuming that embryos and beginning fetus are wrong to kill.” But as already explained above, anti-abortion activists don’t do this. 

NN: sometimes they do, or they appear to: they call embryos babies or children and leave it at that: no explanation for why they are wrong to kill (maybe because they think that's obvious, since babies and children are wrong to kill) and no explanation for why embryos are young people and must be treated as young people (maybe because they think that's obvious, since babies and children are persons).

So, if that’s his claim, he’s simply wrong. Alternatively, he might mean the argument uses the controversial premise—one that opponents of the conclusion would reject—that early embryos and fetuses are babies/children. If this is his claim, then, as stated above, Nobis seems to think an argument begs the question when someone would reject one of its premises

NN: again, no. There is no suggestion that if someone would reject a premise of an argument, then it is a question begging argument. This suggests that just about any argument is or can be question begging, if you can find someone who rejects a premise. I don't suggest or appeal to anything like that. 

, which misunderstands the fallacy. Either way, he’s mistaken: the argument doesn’t beg the question, and his accusation fails.

Response to Section 2

In section 2, Nobis argues for three claims. First, he contends that most anti-abortion arguments are poor. Second, he argues that embryos and early fetuses aren’t babies or children. Lastly, he argues that nobody must nor should accept the view that persons are individual substances of a rational nature.

The argument for the first claim—that most anti-abortion arguments are poor—links to an article where he assesses several arguments against abortion. For example, he provides the following argument: “Human fetuses are biologically human organisms, so they are persons, which makes them wrong to kill!” He then accuses the argument of being circular. However, the argument is not circular.

NN: but continue reading in the next paragraph when "human fetuses" was explicated as "biologically human organisms," as is common: 

“biologically human organisms are persons because they are biologically human organisms.” 

This is not informative--we know they are biologically human organisms, so we need to be told something new to reasonably conclude they are persons. Folks who make this soundbite should do better here.  

As explained previously, an argument is circular or begs the question only when it uses the conclusion as a reason to believe one of its premises. However, the anti-abortion activist does not use the conclusion as a reason to believe either premise. The anti-abortion activist doesn’t use the conclusion to believe that human fetuses are biologically human organisms, nor do they use it to believe that all biologically human organisms are persons. Therefore, the accusation that this anti-abortion argument is guilty of begging the question does not hold.

Nobis also complains that the argument doesn’t explain what makes biologically human organisms persons. This is true—it doesn’t. But neither was it attempting to do so

NN: I think that many enthusiasts think it does. Ask around.

, so this is not a substantial complaint.

However, this may not be the argument Nobis thinks is circular. He also gives the following argument just before the accusation of circularity, namely, “biologically human organisms are persons because they are biologically human organisms.” There are two problems with this. First, not even this argument begs the question. Again, an argument begs the question only when its conclusion is used to justify one of its premises. This argument doesn’t use (and doesn’t need to use) its conclusion to justify its premise. True, it’s not a particularly useful argument. But it doesn’t commit the fallacy of begging the question.

Again, this is not informative--we know they are biologically human organisms, so we need to be told something new to reasonably conclude they are persons. Folks who make this soundbite should do better here.  

Second, it’s more charitable to interpret this as an explanation, not an argument. Now, Nobis might still complain that it’s an uninformative explanation. Admittedly, it’s not especially informative. 

NN: indeed.

But it’s not entirely uninformative. It says there is something about having the essence of being a human organism in general that confers personhood on particular human organisms. 

NN: well, you are adding words to what enthusiastic people often say. If they said that though, that might be an improvement, since they'd be acknowledging complexity and the need for real explanations and so moving beyond the common, "Humans have human rights simply because they are human," with no question about what "human" means or refers to.

Consider this explanation: Uranium explodes before it reaches a ten-ton weight because it’s uranium. What this says is that individual pieces of uranium explode before they reach a ten-ton weight because there is something about having the essence of uranium that disposes them to explode before they reach that weight. Again, while not especially informative, this explanation is perfectly fine. (For more on such explanations, see Elanor Taylor’s “A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle” in Levels of Explanation, forthcoming.) 

NN: Yes, uranium explodes because it's uranium, and uranium explodes because it's uranium, which is explosive are also not informative. 

The argument for the second claim—that embryos and early fetuses aren’t babies or children—is that babies and children are persons, but embryos and early fetuses aren’t persons since they aren’t (and never have been) conscious, aware, thinking, or feeling. This argument is unconvincing because some infants, babies, or children are not (and never have been) conscious, aware, thinking, or feeling, specifically children with anencephaly. 

NN: when people say that babies and children are persons who are wrong to kill, we are thinking about typical babies and children. "Whatabout anencephalic babies, like the Baby Theresa case??" and "Whatabout hypothetical never-conscious babies??" is a distraction to the point. I could have included qualifications here, but word limits prevented that: engaging those whatabouts would be an unwise use of small space. 

As one embryology textbook puts it, “Infants with anencephaly lack a functional forebrain (cerebrum) and fail to gain consciousness” (Schoenwolf, et al., Larsen’s Human Embryology, 4th ed., 113). Another text explains that “Children with such severe skull and brain defects cannot survive” (Sadler, T. W., Langman’s Medical Embryology, 12th ed., 137). 

Nobis might respond that such infants, babies, and children are not persons because they aren’t (and never have been) conscious, aware, thinking, or feeling, and, therefore, are not paradigmatic examples of infants, babies, and children. There are two problems with this response. First, it misses the point. Even if such infants, babies, and children are not persons, it is still true that words like ‘infant,’ ‘baby,’ and ‘child’ are used literally for them. 

NN: again, people can talk however they want, but I suspect people who have had an anencephalic baby will recognize that they didn't have a "baby" in any typical sense. And they may have treated that baby in ways that typical babies aren't treated: e.g., they may have let that baby die, whereas, of course, it'd usually be wrong to let a typical baby die. The famous Baby Theresa case was about killing such a baby, and it's usually wrong to kill babies. 

Anyway, there are things to say about an argument like this, but I'll just say that such an argument does not seem promising to me, for many reasons:

1. Anencephalic babies are babies.

2. If anencephalic babies are babies, then embryos are babies too.

3. So embryos are babies too. 

Second, anti-abortion advocates don’t need to think early embryos and fetuses are paradigmatic babies and children to claim that words like ‘baby’ and ‘child’ can be used literally for them. It would be a strange view to hold that a word for something can be used literally only for its paradigmatic cases. After all, we still use the word ‘dog’ literally for non-paradigmatic dogs.

The argument for the third claim—that nobody must nor should accept the view that persons are individual substances of a rational nature—is based on the fact that there is no good reason to accept this view and that such a view is offensive to people with severe mental disabilities. However, this would likely be surprising to experts in the field of philosophy of disabilities (see Scott Williams’s “Personhood, Ethics, and Disability: A Comparison of Byzantine, Boethian, and Modern Concepts of Personhood”).

More could and should be said here, but I suspect that "pro-life vegans" would have a good perspective here. They are aware that anti-abortion folks often excuse cruelty to animals on the grounds that (sentient) animals are the wrong "kind" of being for having basic moral rights. What's the right kind, on their view? Rational beings, or the kind with some rational beings as members, or the kind defined in terms of those actually rational beings. 

So, there's a theoretical choice here, and they choose the kind described in terms of having members like, say, Einstein, which (they claim) excludes animals (even though, of course, Einstein and many animals are also the same kind: sentient beings). In that way, it might seem that mentally challenged humans' value is not based on what they are like on their own, or their intrinsic qualities, but on their relations to Einstein-like beings: you are valuable because you are a kind of being that, well, is not much like you, as you actually are. That's offensive, or is to some.

You could even think about this with a baby: why is a baby valuable on this view? Not really just because of what they are actually like now, since they aren't currently rational, but of what they could be, and likely will be, namely rational. Now there are complications here since our modal properties (that is, here possible properties) also are actual properties (you actually have the property of possibly being p, etc.), so this gets into complications about "moral individualism."

Here's another general observation. Consider these two arguments:

1. Embryos are people, who are usually wrong to kill.

2. All people are usually wrong to kill.

3. So embryos are usually wrong to kill. 

 

1. Embryos are young people--babies or children--who are usually wrong to kill.

2. All young people--babies or children--are usually wrong to kill.

3. So embryos are usually wrong to kill. 

The 2nd argument is not an improvement on the 1st.

Response to Section 3

In Section 3, Nobis argues that the etymology of the word ‘fetus’, meaning ‘little one,’ doesn’t determine its meaning today. He supports this claim by citing examples of words that have changed their meanings over time. For instance, ‘bully’ once meant ‘sweetheart.’ This example, along with others, demonstrates that words often shift in meaning from their etymological roots. However, this does not mean that etymology has no relevance in understanding the meaning of words today. The key is determining whether there is a connection between a word’s etymological background and its current usage. Today, the word ‘fetus’ is technically used to refer to a developing human organism from week nine to birth. But why is this the case? The best explanation is that, during this stage of development, the early biologically human organism takes on features that closely resemble the form it will have at birth (see picture below). In other words, it looks like a small paradigmatic baby or child—a little one. Thus, it is best to understand the word ‘fetus’ today as connected to its etymological roots.

NN: this does not support thinking that word origins somehow show or make it the case that embryos and beginning fetuses are wrong to kill and/or are persons. 

(Picture taken from Carlson, Bruce M., Human Embryology & Developmental Biology, 456)

NN: in sum, I am not finding much of a defense of thinking that embryos and beginning fetuses are babies or children--young people--and/or that everyone must agree they are, or that my short writing explaining why nobody must agree to this is mistaken. 

Like I have said though, this is a very much underexplored topic: I think the only person who has written much about it might be me: the only other thing I know of is Don Marquis observing that the claim "fetuses look like babies" is hard to establish early in pregnancy. So perhaps these thoughts here will enable Golprey Predork to positively contribute to this discussion. 

Were you an embryo or early pre-conscious fetus? Was that embryo you?

Were you an embryo or early pre-conscious fetus? Was that embryo you?

A very common type of view about "personal identity"--called a psychological theory of personal identity--suggests that the correct answer here is, "No, I was not literally an embryo! That embryo that I developed from was not me!"

According to that view, we were not literally embryos (although we of course developed out of them!) because we and our bodies are not the same thing. So, just because there is (or was) a particular living body, that doesn't mean that we are there. 

According to this view, we are our minds, our consciousness: to simplify, we are sets of overlapping conscious experiences. 

So, on this view, if you became permanently unconscious, you would end: your body might continue to live, but your life would be over. (People who would not want to go to sleep and never wake up may be sympathetic to this view). 

The abstract topic of personal identity addresses how we continue to exist over time, despite our many changes, and thus addresses what we really are, in our essential qualities--the qualities or characteristics we must have to continue to exist. The psychological theory of personal identity view proposes that we are (meaning are identical to) our minds, so we could not be a being without a mind, like an embryo. 

This is an abstract issue; it's explained more in this view below, but the main alternative--for people who reject a psychological theory of personal identity--is to think that you = your body, so whenever a particular living body exists, you exist. Most people don't believe this type of view, for good reasons! Another option is to think that they are an immaterial soul: how's that as an option?

@nathan.nobis Why you might think that you weren't an embryo. Depends on what "you" are, in your essence! #ethics #philosophy #personalidentity #metaphysics #abortion #prochoice #prolife #life #death #braindeath #coma #comatose #euthanasia ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis

An article on these topics.

 

Abortion and ethics quiz questions

My abortion and ethics quiz -- which I created at the suggestion of someone on TikTok -- has an opportunity to add questions. Below the fold are the questions that people have suggested. Since the list is very long, I asked ChatGPT to sum up the themes:

The list contains various philosophical and ethical questions regarding abortion, personhood, and reproductive rights. Here’s a concise summary based on the main themes:

Human Value and Personhood: 

• Are humans more valuable than other animals, and what defines personhood?
• What criteria grant personhood (e.g., consciousness, sentience)?

Moral and Ethical Considerations: 

1. When does a fetus acquire moral status?
2. Is there a moral distinction between abortion and infanticide?
3. What makes a life valuable, and why is killing considered wrong?

Bodily Autonomy: 

• Do individuals have the right to make decisions about their own bodies, particularly regarding pregnancy?
• How do the rights of the pregnant person weigh against the rights of the fetus?

Legal and Social Implications: 

• Should laws reflect a balance between the rights of the mother and those of the fetus?
• What role does consent play in discussions about parenthood and abortion?

Religious and Cultural Perspectives: 

• How do different religious beliefs influence views on abortion?
• What impact does societal perception have on the legality and morality of abortion?

Practical Concerns:

• Considerations regarding the responsibilities of parents towards their offspring.
• Discussion on the implications of enforced abortion under various circumstances (interest of parents, health of the mother, etc.).

Controversial Scenarios: 

• Questions proposing extreme or hypothetical scenarios, including parental rights, potential health risks, and moral dilemmas surrounding unwanted pregnancies.
• These themes reflect deep-seated societal debates about the nature of life, individual rights, and the ethical ramifications of abortion.

 

The rough answers are below; sorry about the less than ideal formatting: 

Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children"?

Are Embryos “Babies” and “Children”? 

On the Bioethics Today blog.

Anti-abortion advocates frequently insist that abortion is “killing babies” and “murdering children.” “Heartbeat” bills, or abortion bans, often use this language. Alabama’s Supreme Court even ruled that frozen embryos are children.

While philosophers have much discussed how “persons” and “human beings” are best defined, there is little comparable discussion about defining “babies” and “children.”

Here I argue that embryos and beginning fetuses are not “babies” or “children”: at least, nobody must agree that they are.

1.

First, let’s acknowledge that it’s perfectly fine for anyone to call their own embryo or fetus their “baby” or “child.” Nicknames are common for fetuses: “bean,” “bun,” and “bunny” are popular. 

We use terms of endearment like these to express emotions, which is entirely appropriate, not to state literal truths: a fetus is not a “bean,” of course!

So, it might be that when expectant parents or their healthcare providers call an embryo or beginning fetus a “baby” or “child,” they are using that language to express excitement, hope, and expectation, but not say anything that’s literally true. 

When anti-abortion activists call an embryo or a fetus a “baby” or “child,” they claim to mean that literally. Must everyone agree? No. 

Anti-abortion activists say that embryos and fetuses are children because if they are children, that would support the anti-abortion position—everyone agrees that babies and children are generally wrong to kill. So when anti-abortion activists call embryos and beginning fetuses “babies” and “children,” they are typically just assuming that embryos and beginning fetuses are wrong to kill, apparently expecting that people should agree. 

But they can’t assume that. This is the fallacy called “begging the question,” which involves assuming what needs to be argued for. The suggested reasoning, “Abortion—that is, killing fetuses to end pregnancies—is wrong because fetuses are wrong to kill” is circular reasoning, which is always bad. 

2. 

When anti-abortion advocates give reasons to support thinking that killing embryos and early fetuses is wrong, their arguments tend to be poor: e.g., “Human fetuses are biologically human organisms, so they are persons, which makes them wrong to kill!” 

Yes, we know their species: they aren’t canine or bovine. But saying “biologically human organisms are persons because they are biologically human organisms” is again circular and doesn’t tell us what makes biologically human organisms persons when they are.

Likewise, asserting that embryos and early fetuses are “human beings”—meaning biologically human persons—doesn’t justify thinking they are persons. Yes, human persons are persons, but that doesn’t mean that embryos and early fetuses are persons.

Current concerns about artificial intelligence can be helpfully applied here. In wondering whether any AI will ever be a person, most people are asking whether it will be conscious, aware, thinking, and feeling like us. According to many, that’s roughly what a person is and what makes something a someone who is wrong to kill. 

But embryos and beginning fetuses don’t have any of these characteristics: so they aren’t persons. Since babies and children are persons, we shouldn’t think that embryos and beginning fetuses are babies or children. Likewise, even though embryos and beginning fetuses are “offspring” in a biological sense, that doesn’t mean they have the moral status of offspring who are persons or person-like.

There are alternative theories of personhood—e.g., that persons are “individual substances of a rational nature” or “members of a rational species”—but nobody must accept these more abstract proposals and attempts to apply them to embryos and early fetuses. Furthermore, these theories are offensive to people with severe mental disabilities who are valuable persons for what they are actually like, not because of what other human beings are like or because they could have been more sophisticated “rational” thinkers had things been different for them.

So, in sum, nobody is rationally compelled to agree that embryos and beginning fetuses are “babies” or “children” or that we all must call them that. 

3.

Nevertheless, let’s examine some other considerations given in defense of the claim that embryos and early fetuses are babies or children. 

Anti-abortion advocates sometimes claim that we should think this because of the (alleged) origin of the word “fetus,” as “little one.” But original meanings of words don’t determine current meanings: e.g., ‘bully’ used to mean ‘sweetheart’ or ‘darling’, but current school rules against bullying don’t rule out celebrating Valentine’s Day. 

So, claims about what is what (and who is what) are not settled by word origins and past usage. And how some people talk and conceptualize things need not dictate how everyone talks and understands. 

4. 

Another set of concerns comes from people who experience miscarriages. 

Some anti-abortion advocates claim that some pro-choice people are callous towards people who experience miscarriages as the loss of their baby or child: “It’s not a baby, so you shouldn’t be grieving like that!!” (Anti-abortion advocates can also be callous when pro-choice women have miscarriages: “Why are you bothered since you don’t think you lost a baby??!”). 

Now, grieving people first need sympathy and support: they don’t need to be “argued” with, at least initially, if at all. But some people who suffer miscarriages grieve the loss of an expected future that depended on that fetus surviving: they can’t have a valuable-for-their-own-sake baby or child without an embryo and fetus, and so that makes them at least valuable-as-a-means towards that end. (This helps explain why murdering pregnant women is especially bad and why we’d have special laws against that, even if we don’t think that beginning fetuses are persons). 

But this doesn’t mean that embryos and early fetuses really are babies or children. In this way of thinking, a miscarriage is a profound loss, but a loss of a potential future with a potential someone, not a loss of someone who currently exists. Seeing it this way is helpful for some people, and it might be true, too. 

Others, however, see an early miscarriage as a loss of a person, a someone, a real baby or child: they were a mother then, not a mother-to-be, and now they, tragically, are not. For some of these people, it could be worthwhile to help them think through whether that’s the best way to understand their loss. If their views change, that could benefit them emotionally. 

For people who are convinced that they lost a genuine baby or child, there is little value in “arguing” with them. But, the quality of evidence for their views will not be so strong that everyone else must agree and think that all embryos and beginning fetuses are babies or children.

5. 

Finally, some common anti-abortion reasoning begins by observing that if a born baby is a baby, then so is a 9-month-old fetus, and if an 8-month-old fetus is a baby, and if . .  which often leads to this bad argument: 

“There’s no clear point to say when a fetus no longer ‘looks like a baby,’ so you should conclude that embryos ‘look like babies’ or treat them as if they are.” 

This is bad reasoning since we often don’t have to “draw lines” to see clear cases: there’s no clear line when “babyhood” and childhood end, yet we know a 50-year-old isn’t some kid anymore.  

A simpler response to this line of reasoning, though, is this: we should agree that later, more developed fetuses do look like babies but recognize that babies aren’t valuable because they look like babies: they are valuable for their own sakes because of the psychological—emotional and cognitive—presences they bring to the world. Anyone concerned with fetal pain recognizes this point. 

But embryos and beginning fetuses completely lack consciousness, so they lack value in their own right. And most abortions occur early in pregnancy before, consciousness arises and even before the fetus “looks like a baby.” So most abortions—early abortions—decidedly do not involve killing “babies” or “children.” 

6.

Again, people are free to call embryos and beginning fetuses pretty much whatever they want, especially their own embryos and beginning fetuses. So whenever anyone expresses excitement about what they describe as their new “baby” or “child” in utero, that’s great! We should be happy for them and with them! 

We can be happy for them, however, and deny that this type of language is literally true, always required, and—especially—an appropriate basis for laws and policies against abortion. So, nobody must accept a mere assumption that all embryos and beginning fetuses are babies and children, or any circular, question-begging reasoning given to think that, or any dubious philosophical arguments given to think that all embryos and beginning fetuses are young people who, like all people, are generally wrong to kill. 

In sum, there’s no good reason to accept the anti-abortion claim that embryos and beginning fetuses are babies and children—and that we all must call them that—and ample reason to deny it. These insights should inform and guide both personal thinking and action and our collective laws and policies.

Nathan Nobis, PhD (@NathanNobis) is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College.

When does human life begin? Well, when does human life end? On euthanasia and abortion.

For the Society of Christian Bioethics conference. Unfortunately, I cannot make the event, so I made a video. 

When does human life begin? Well, when does human life end? On euthanasia and abortion.

The question, “When does human life begin?” is often taken to be a key question in the discussion of the ethics of abortion, especially among general audiences. I observe that this question can be interpreted in a number of ways, due to “human” and “life” having multiple meanings—biological or scientific meanings and moral meanings—and that these different meanings yield different arguments against abortion that would be evaluated in different ways: some are definitely unsound, some are, at best, controversial and in need of defense.

I suggest, however, that engaging the question “When does human life end?” or when can it end, will help us better understand what “human life” is, in the morally relevant sense. So, thinking through a number of common ways that human life can end can help us understand what “life” is, in the morally significant sense, and when “life” begins.

This understanding supports thinking that early abortions, and so most abortions, are morally permissible and shouldn’t be banned or criminalized. This discussion supports thinking about abortion in the broader context of other bioethical issues—which sometimes doesn’t happen—and applying insights from these other issues to abortion. It also helps us see why, pace many anti-abortion activists, issues about “when life begins” are, or can be, religious issues, just as questions about “when life ends” are, or can be, religious issues. 

@nathan.nobis When does life begin? Well, when does life end? #abortion #ethics #philosophy ♬ original sound - Philosophy 101 - Prof. Nobis

Some related readings:

• On Marquis (see Thinking Critically About Abortion, section 5.1.5) and section 4 of "The Ethics of Abortion" at 1000-Word Philosophy. 
• "Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing."
• On Beckwith.
• On George and Tollefsen. 
• On Tollefsen. 
• "When does life begin? When if comes to abortion, it depends what you mean by 'life'" At Salon.

My views are similar to Swinburne's here: pp. 315–316 of "Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy":

 

Confirmation bias, in-group bias, tribalism, & groupthink.

What's it called when people form their views on controversial issues, but only consider perspectives from their own in-group or "tribe" and so they don't get an accurate picture of alternative, rival views, including the views of experts who disagree with them? What are the themes of this type of problem?

ChatGPT said:

The phenomenon you're describing is often referred to as confirmation bias or in-group bias. This occurs when individuals only seek out or give weight to information that aligns with their existing beliefs, often disregarding or dismissing opposing viewpoints. When this happens within a group, it can also be called tribalism or groupthink.

Themes of This Problem:

1. Echo Chambers: Environments where people only hear opinions that reinforce their own, leading to a distorted understanding of issues.

2. Polarization: Increased division between groups, where individuals become more extreme in their views due to a lack of exposure to diverse perspectives.

3. Misinformation: The spread of false or misleading information, often amplified by in-group dynamics, as members may prioritize loyalty to the group over factual accuracy.

4. Intellectual Isolation: A refusal to engage with opposing ideas can lead to stagnation in critical thinking and a lack of nuanced understanding.

5. Trust in Authority: Preference for information from familiar sources or leaders within one's group, sometimes at the expense of expert opinions.

6. Emotional Reasoning: Decisions and beliefs influenced more by emotions and identity than by factual evidence, which can reinforce in-group cohesion but hinder constructive dialogue.

Addressing these themes often requires fostering open-mindedness, encouraging critical thinking, and promoting respectful dialogue across different viewpoints.

Comments on "Pro-Choice: The Wrong Side of History, Science, & Logic" by Tim Stratton, "Free Thinking Ministries"

Today I happened to see some FB post that led to a FB post claiming that abortion is a "great evil." That Harris-Walz support abortion rights--this "great evil"-- was given as a reason to not vote for them. 

When asked about this, the person who made these claims, a Tim Stratton, pointed me to this page:

Pro-Choice: The Wrong Side of History, Science, & Logic

The contents of this page were apparently thought to show that abortion is, in general, wrong and should be illegal.

Unfortunate, the arguments given do not show this. They are very poor arguments, and they show the signs of people engaging issues but (a) not engaging with people who disagree with them and, especially, (b) not engaging with the most informed, most knowledgeable people on these sorts of issues. 

Here I will briefly explain why these are bad arguments. Time is short and so I will often refer anyone reading this to other sources, which is fine since nothing on this page was new. I will cut and paste his text (in their original font) and keep my responses--given in text, in red bold--quick:

However, when those who do not even think God exists still come to see that abortion is murder, how can a Christian justify his or her vote to empower a politician who seeks to support those who murder babies? How does this not make one an accomplice to murder?

The rest of this article will be looking at the arguments Challies offered which do not rely on the Bible or any religious views. He began with my favorite methodology…

LOGIC

Challies references Scott Klusendorf’s booklet, “Pro-Life 101,” as he summarizes the pro-life argument in the following manner: “Elective abortion unjustly takes the life of a defenseless human being.” He supports this statement via deductive reasoning:

1- Intentionally killing an innocent human being is a moral wrong.
2- Elective abortion is the intentional killing of an innocent human being.
3- Therefore, elective abortion is a moral wrong.

The critical step in this argument is the second premise. As Challies noted, “if the pre-born child is an innocent human being (premise #2), then elective abortion is always a moral wrong.” So, the question is raised: Is the pre-born an innocent human being? This question is vital for all people — especially the church — to properly understand because…

“If the unborn are not human, no justification for elective abortion is necessary. But if the unborn are human, no justification for elective abortion is adequate.” — Greg Koukl

Challies followed that by pointing out that we should “always bring the discussion back to this question: What is the pre-born?” While the Bible is clear on this topic, we do not even need to reference it to come to our conclusions since science comes to the same conclusions.

Comment:  

• yes, obviously, these embryos and fetuses are biologically human: they aren't canine of bovine. 
• while they are "human beings" in the sense of "biologically human organisms," they are not "human beings" in the sense of being biologically human organisms who are persons: they lack what makes us persons, which is our having minds. (Would you mind taking a nap .. and never waking up? Yes, because your mind would end; your existence as a person would end, even though a living biologically human organism might remain). This is a well-known distinction, which yields different arguments, each of which is unsound about early fetuses. 
• they are neither innocent nor not innocent: only agents or persons can be innocent: innocence requires the ability to do wrong and not do it: this term doesn't apply. 
• So this is a common argument that only has superficial appeal. 

SCIENCE

There is conclusive scientific evidence that all pre-born children share four common characteristics:

Complete. From the moment of fertilization the pre-born child is complete. All the information that needs to be there is there. It simply needs time to grow.

Unique. The scientific evidence of DNA proves that the pre-born child is unique and genetically distinct from his or her mother. The pre-born child is not a part of the mother (like an appendix), but a unique entity inside his or her mother.

Living. The laws of biology tell us that the pre-born child is alive because it is growing, developing, and undergoing metabolism and responding to stimuli.

Human. The scientific law of biogenesis states that living things reproduce after their own kind. So, dogs beget dogs, cats beget cats, goldfish beget goldfish and humans beget humans. Not parasites or blobs of cells, but humans—complete and unique living human beings.

Challies reiterates for the sake of clarification: “Science tells us unequivocally that the pre-born child is a complete and a unique living human being.”

Comment:  

• yes, obviously, these embryos and fetuses are mammalian organisms and the bodies of mammals start early. 
• obviously, they are biologically human organisms: that's not a "human being" in the morally relevant sense though, according to most people, which you can get them to realize by thinking about various end of life cases;
• as a matter of literal logic, nothing follows from this apart from very dubious and controversial premises.  

BACK TO LOGIC

So, science implies that the pre-born is a human person. 

Comment:  

• no, science doesn't address what is and isn't a person: this is naive scientism. 

In fact, even Hillary Clinton agrees and says, “The unborn PERSON does not have constitutional rights.” She goes on to imply that that’s just the way it is according to the constitution. Too bad too sad for pre-born human persons! At least Hitler and the KKK denied the personhood of Jews and blacks so they could sleep at night! 

Comment:  

• no, this involves avoiding thinking about how embryos and these people are different in very important ways. 

How can anyone justify the grotesque murder of an innocent little baby who they admit — and know — is a human person?

Comment:  

• they usually don't "admit" this. But this is a bad rhetorical question. 

They are fine with changing the laws when it comes to gun control, gay marriage, and bathroom policies, but why shrug your shoulders and say, “oh well, that’s just the law,” when it comes to the murder of baby humans?

Comment:  

• babies are young people; embryos and beginning fetuses are not people, so they aren't babies. 

Perhaps the liberals in the clutches of Planned Parenthood might respond (as Challies noted): “But the pre-born are different than the rest of us and so they don’t deserve the same protections that you or I do.” Greg Koukl responds:

Abortion-choice advocates typically cite one or more characteristics they believe make a human being a person. Each of these characteristics fall under one of four categories. You can remember these categories with the acronym SLED: Size, Level of development, Environment, and Degree of dependency. . . none of them [make] a relevant difference. None of them justifies killing the unborn.

This is clearly demonstrated through basic critical thinking on each of these four issues. Here is the SLED acronym offered by Klusendorf and Koukl:

Size. The pre-born are smaller than born humans, but size does not determine our humanity. Infants are smaller than toddlers, and toddlers smaller than teenagers, but all are human and all are deserving of the law’s protection.

Level of Development. The pre-born are less developed than born humans, but our level of development does not determine our humanity. Toddlers are less developed than adults, but both are human and both are deserving of protection under the law.

Environment. The pre-born are certainly in a different place than born humans, but where we are does not determine who we are. If we are human, we deserve the law’s protection no matter where we are.

Degree of Dependency. The pre-born are more dependent on their mothers than most born humans, but infants are just as dependent. Our dependency does not determine our humanity.

Comment:  

• this "SLED" mantra seems to be born of groupthink: it's the result of what happens when people develop views with no outside input, especially critical input. Put simply, nobody believes this and it assumes things that can't be assumed. No thoughtful abortion advocate accepts such a principle: nobody should think personhood is defeated or eliminated by SLED factors. 

Trot Out the Toddler

After examining the pre-born through the lens of the SLED test, it becomes clear that if one is going to continue to support abortion, then, to be consistent, they must also support a mother’s right to kill her toddler too! This follows because any justification one makes for abortion based on the four points above would also apply to a toddler. 

Comment:  

• no, this would only happen if someone has a pretty thoughtless defense of early abortions. That might be true of some random people, but it's not true of people who actually study these issues. 

If we are to consider ourselves as a nation of rational thinkers, then if one is going to say there is nothing wrong with terminating the pre-born, then, if logically consistent, they have no grounds to state that terminating toddlers is wrong or evil either.

Comment:  

• no. I suggest making a list of what toddlers are like, and a list of what embryos are like, and thinking about what characteristics are morally relevant and not. 

So, both logic and science clearly demonstrate that abortion is the murder of a pre-born human person. However, what if some are so blindly committed to a political party or a specific politician they affirm that logic and science demonstrate that the pre-born child is a human, but it is not a person? This is where History comes into play.

HISTORY

As I mentioned above, the Nazis and the KKK tried to justify their actions by denying the personhood of certain human beings. Consider all of these examples from history:

1858, Viriginia Supreme Court: “In the eyes of the law… the slave is not a person.”

1881, American Law Review: “An Indian is not a person within the meaning of the Constitution.”

1928, Supreme Court of Canada: “The meaning of ‘qualified persons’ does not include women.”

1936, German Supreme Court: “The Reichgericht itself refused to recognize Jews… as ‘persons’ in the legal sense.”

Comment:  

• that mistakes were made in previous thinking about who is a person and who is not a person gives no support to thinking that embryos are persons. (Question: does this strategy support thinking that some animals are persons?)

1997, Supreme Court of Canada: “The law of Canada does not recognize the unborn child as a legal person possessing rights.”

In regards to each one of these examples, Challies made a powerful point:

. . . science and common sense tells us that they are human. Only the law had the chilling audacity to strip these groups of personhood. If someone is a living human being, then they are a person.

 Comment:  

• This is thoughtless or uninformed or both. "If someone is a living human being, meaning a living human person, then they are a person." Yes, of course! "If someone is a living human being, meaning a living biologically human organism, then they are a person." No, not at all: it depends on what other characteristics that organism has: in particular, do they have a mind or any kind?

A separation between these two can only ever lead to evil.

Perhaps you are unconvinced that the pre-born human baby is a person, but are you convinced that the pre-born human baby is not a person? How do you know? Unless you are 100% certain that the pre-born human baby is not a person, then don’t you think it is better to be safe than sorry? Consider this comic strip which forcefully makes the point (click here).

Comment:  

• Question: does this strategy support thinking that some animals are persons?
• Also, this doesn't consider the risks of not allowing abortion. It's not considering all the relevant factors, in this bad rhetorical question. 

Abortion is an evil violation of human rights. I am glad that many non-Chrstians (including atheists) are coming to see this is the case based on science and reason. With that said, however, Christians not only have science and reason at our disposal, we also have the ultimate authority in the Word of God; therefore, we have additional warrant for recognizing (as Challies noted), “the pre-born children as our neighbors, made in the image of God, we must be at the forefront of defending their lives.” We must do this by speaking the truth in love (Eph 4:15)!

Conclusion

Many times Christians will counter that they vote for Pro-Choice candidates because they are not “one-issue voters.” I respond by pointing out that some issues are big enough to reject a candidate completely. After all, suppose Hitler got every singe issue right — except for the Holocaust! I hope that would make you a “one-issue voter.” What if a white supremacist got it right on every single issue — except did not see blacks as “persons” and thought they should all either be enslaved or killed. I don’t know about you, but I do not care how awesome the rest of their policies were, I would NEVER vote for a white supremacist dirt bag!

Challies concluded by referencing Bonhoeffer: “Silence in the face of evil is itself evil. God will not hold us guiltless. Not to speak is to speak. Not to act is to act.”

If silence in the face of evil is evil, what is voting for and empowering a politician who supports this holocaust of abortion that has been taking place since 1973? If you are a Christian, how are you going to look in the face of Jesus one day and justify those votes? I am not a Republican or a Democrat; I am an independent and freethinking voter. I am not endorsing any candidate, but stating as fact that a true Christian has no grounds to vote for a pro-choice candidate; it is better to not vote at all, than to vote for a politician who fights to keep the murder of babies legal.

Bottom Line: If you would not vote for Hitler, then you should not vote for a pro-choice candidate!

Don’t be on the wrong side of history; rather, be on the side of truth (John 18:37)!

Stay reasonable (Philippians 4:5),

Comment:  

• this does not appear to be that. This is a document that appears to be born of just not understand these issues very well. That happens to members of groups like these. Not good!

This was, of course, quick, but it shows that at least this document doesn't make a good case that early abortions are a great evil. If anyone would like an details on any of this, please let me know. NN. 

Tim Stratton