I wrote comments on that person's comments in bold. Since I wrote these I am posting them below.
Original article: https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article/36/3/261/895026?login=false
[My responses in brackets]
"suppose we accept the somewhat indeterminate claim that fetuses and adults are the same 'substance' or 'type,'"
[indeterminate? how so?]
See next paragraph
"...that fetuses and adults are the same 'substance' or 'type,' despite the fact that it seems they can also be described as being different substances and types as well: [e.g.] fetuses are pre- or never-been-conscious substances and adults are have-been-conscious substances"
[these differences are accidental differences that apply to the same substance;
This is missing the point that we can be accurately described as members of different types and different substances (or at least there are competing candidates for what substance(s) we are).
And most importantly you are assuming that the body is the relevant substance.
And, just because X is the same substance over time doesn't entail X has the same other properties at all times: things change. You can’t assume that moral properties are essential to that substance, or that the substance has those properties at all times it exists (and couldn’t exist without them).
The point, again:
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/
1. Human Organisms?
Fetuses are not just biologically alive. And they aren’t just biologically human either, like skin cells or organs. They are biologically human organisms.
Some thinkers argue that our being human organisms physically continuous with fetuses that were human organisms makes abortion wrong.2 They seem to argue that since it is wrong to kill us now, i.e., we have properties that make it wrong to kill us now (prima facie wrong to kill: wrong unless extreme circumstances justify the killing), it was wrong to kill us at any stage of our development, since we’ve been the same organism, the same being, throughout our existence.
While this argument is influential in some circles, it is nevertheless dubious. You are likely over three feet tall now, but weren’t always. You can reason morally, but couldn’t always. You have the right to make autonomous decisions about your own life, but didn’t always. Many examples show that just because we have some characteristic, including a moral right now, that doesn’t entail that we (or our bodies?) have always had that characteristic or right. This argument’s advocates need to plausibly explain why that’d be different with, say, the right to life.3
even the same adult is sometimes conscious & sometimes not, but those don't change what he is; if they did, we wouldn't even be able to say the same adult is sometimes conscious and sometimes not", only "this adult is conscious" and then separately, seemingly about a different person "this adult is not conscious"]
no. That people sleep is not a good objection to the most common and popular explanation of what's called personal identity, namely psychological theories of personal identity:
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2022/02/03/psychological-approaches-to-personal-identity/
We are still conscious beings even though we aren’t conscious at every moment: how is that? See what the view says.
"But adults and children have all sorts of physical, cognitive, and moral properties that fetuses lack. So just because normal adults are wrong to kill, it does not immediately follow that the fetuses they were would have been... wrong to kill even if there is numerical identity"
[assuming that Mentalism is thought to provide the salient difference, I'll address it below]
Mentalism- “a human being is intrinsically valuable if and only if she presently possesses certain properties and/or is able to exercise certain functions”
"Mentalists argue that beings that have never had mental lives or have lost their minds fully and permanently lack moral rights, are not persons, are not moral subjects, and/or are not morally valuable in their own right."
[is this a fair representation of your view?]
Yes.
Beckwith's 1st objection to mentalism: inequality
"prima facie implausible since virtually nobody argues, for example, that geniuses are morally entitled to, say, enslave the feeble-minded"
[see Peter Singer, Charles Murray, the rise of "low IQ" discourse online]
You will not find this in Peter Singer and other philosophers. I grant that you can find a rando saying just anything. I don't think you will find anyone many people saying this though: if not, prove it, re. Finding someone argue that we should be enslaving not so smart people.
"if an individual meets some minimum threshold of a mental life, then that individual has an equal right to consideration or rights as anyone else"
[What is the minimum threshold?
Common proposals involve being a sentient being, being a sentient being that exists over time–has connected mental states, being a sentient being that exists over time–has connected mental states that’s the “kind” of being that’s a rational being, and more.
Why is it valuable for moral analysis?
Would you mind taking a nap and never waking up (and not having any dreams, etc.) even if your body remained alive?
Why is any mental life beyond that not more valuable?]
You can think that anything that meets the threshold matters equally, or has equal basic rights. Similar to how anyone who meets a threshold passes a class equally. Both 72% and 98% have equally passed the class and are equally eligible to, say, move on to the next class in the sequence.
And, importantly, there is no good reason to deny this.
"if we focus on clear-cut... cases of exploitation (e.g., slavery, child abuse) in contrast with controversial questions about abortion, we can appeal to violations of interests, disrespect, using someone as a mere means, harms, & many other potentially morally relevant concerns"
[Whose interests? Disrespect of whom? Using whom as a mere means? Harming whom? Persons?]
You want me to explain who is the victim of slavery and child abuse? Or that the victims here are victims because they are conscious beings: their being that is a precondition for them being abused?
"He claims that all human beings, at all stages, are 'equal' because they are 'rational moral agents by nature from the moment they come into existence.' But it is not clear what reason Beckwith gives for this claim: As we have seen, numerical identity does not provide it"
[Where have we seen that? Refer back to my earlier point: these differences are accidental differences that apply to the same substance
No: even if if they are the same substance (they are! There's bodily continuity) that doesn't entail that that substance has the same other properties, e.g. moral properties, at all times: see section 1 here:
https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2016/03/07/the-ethics-of-abortion/
Not much of an argument is given for that; it's basically just assumed.
; even the same adult is sometimes conscious & sometimes not, but those don't change what he is; if they did, we wouldn't even be able to say the same adult is sometimes conscious and sometimes not", only "this adult is conscious" and then separately, seemingly about a different person "this adult is not conscious"]
Again, no, but you are assuming facts beyond physical continuity.
"if he thinks we must accept this or else we have no resources to condemn uncontroversial inequalities that is false"
[As long as we smuggle it back in and call it mentalism. Refer back to my earlier point: Whose interests? Disrespect of whom? Using whom as a mere means? Harming whom? Persons?]
Again, in all cases there is a conscious subject with interests, preferences, and so can be harmed, disrespected, etc.
"if he claims we must accept this or else we have no resources to argue against abortion that is both question-begging and false since there are alternative arguments against abortion"
[On that point, we agree]
"the objections to Mentalism do not succeed because it need not justify inequality"
[Yes it does, because it logically leads to the examples such as Peter Singer, Charles Murray, the rise of "low IQ" discourse online, even if well-intentioned Mentalists deploy a level of inconsistency to avoid those outcomes.]
No: it does not “logically” lead to that. Someone might mistakenly think it does, but it doesn't, and doesn't have to. If someone were to claim, “The only reasonable way to think that we shouldn't enslave not smart people is agreeing with Beckwith,” then no. Stronger, “Everyone else who would oppose enslaving not smart people is wrong has a false explanation why that’s wrong, unless they have an explanation like Beckwith’s.” Again, no.
"the Substance View does not seem to do much to justify egalitarianism"
[Rational nature is equally present in every person, even if the actualization of that nature varies widely.]
That anything “follows” from having a “rational nature” would need to be demonstrated or shown, not just assumed. And even just explained, like how in general this is supposed to work, since it doesn’t appear to work about any other characteristics.
https://www.nathannobis.com/2018/09/reply-to-christopher-tollefson-on.html
2nd objection to mentalism: “it is prima facie wrong to destroy the physical structure necessary for the realization of a human being’s basic, natural capacity for the exercisability of a function that is a perfection of its nature"
[This is a moral claim like you say, but I actually think this is an interesting formulation of a point that everybody invokes at one time or another in a variety of settings. E.g. why is unlawful detainment wrong? Not because the place of detainment is absolutely bad (it might even be good in other contexts), but because it keeps the victim from going in search of the perfection of her nature (i.e. the pursuit of happiness
Yes, and note that to be happy, you have to be a conscious subject.
). Would be worth looking into.]
3rd objection: coma patients
Jed 1: " this individual is headed for a very troubled conscious existence, perhaps one that would be better not to start and may even be wrong to start"
[So we should kill him because it's too burdensome to consider his development?]
The main point here is that people sometimes come up with cases, but don’t think about the details and how things are apt to go.
"common theories of personal identity suggest that a new person would emerge from Jed 1 if that life were allowed to continue"
[Goodbye Nathan Nobis, welcome back John Locke. In all seriousness, these theories are so uncommon today that the average reader of this thread would balk at the idea that, if you don't remember a part of your past, that part literally happened to a different person, not you.]
I don’t think you know (a) which views here are most common anymore (what are some of the relevant surveys? What do they suggest?), or (b) know how such views respond to this type of concern. So how do they respond? Hint: no, you (now) do not have to remember everything you have done for that to have happened to you. (That’s asking for the impossible, since we can only remember so much). Given that, how does this type of view explain how we exist over time?
Another source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
"Jed 1’s relatives would feel that he is gone and that the new individual who emerges from his body is not him"
[Earlier on you said that "feelings can be unreliable and first impressions mistaken", so perhaps this is one of those cases.]
Perhaps, yet consider the case applied to yourself: suppose tomorrow the person in your body remembers nothing of your life – remembers nobody you know, etc. – and claims to be Ronald Reagan (or whoever) and talks like Reagan, etc.. Your friends might reasonably eventually think that you are gone, not that you changed (as if you woke up and decided you were going to be more outgoing or whatever.)
Re: theories of continuous personal identity
[Assuming they must be either psychologically-based or bodily (presumably with Ship of Theseus problems) implies a kind of dualist choice
Property dualism, yes (not substance dualism). People often don’t know there there are two broad types of dualism about mind-body issues: The Mind-Body Problem: What Are Minds? by Jacob Berger
but the Substance View could reject both options in the name of one continuous actuality: life that has rational potential.]
Even if one goes with that, being a potential X doesn’t entail you must be treated like an actual X.
Herb: "To many, it might seem that obligations to, or concerning, individuals who we know will emerge from a coma in 7 days are stronger than those we (somehow) know will, or can, emerge in seven decades. Whether time can contribute to making it such that, all things considered, it is permissible to let someone die would need to be addressed. But this again leads us to controversial cases: whether we would be obligated to provide medical support for a coma patient for 70 years who will then wake up and regain his faculties would surely be a controversial issue."
[The question isn't yet "what are our obligations to Herb?" but rather "is Herb a person?". Put obligations aside for a moment, does time impact the metaphysical question? Is he a person if he'll wake up in 7 days but not a person if he'll wake up in 70 years?]
Another option is that Herb the person will return in 70 years now. But, no, an issue here is whether even if Herb is a person, what efforts anyone must put in (at potential costs to other persons) so that he returns: “whether we would be obligated to provide medical support for a coma patient for 70 years who will then wake up and regain his faculties would surely be a controversial issue."
Jed 2: never-actualized potential
"This is a dubious understanding of potential"
[The potential is what makes him different from a literal vegetable that lacks that potential. In the vocal cord sub-example, the woman still has an incomplete vocal system with lungs, larynx, palate, and articulate lips. She wouldn't actually possess those if she lacked even the potential to speak.]
Potential relates to possibility. There are different senses of possibility. You are focusing on physical possibility, but that needn’t be the only relevant sense of possibility (and impossibility) here. Possibility and Necessity: An Introduction to Modality by Andre Leo Rusavuk
[If Beckwith says it's acceptable to let Jed 2 die, I would disagree. The analogy though, should be about killing Jed 2, just as we are killing a fetus.]
This article has numerous problems that fail to disprove the Substance View and fail to justify Mentalism.
If so, the above doesn’t identify those problems.
My sense is that the main issue of the review was ignored: just because something is the "same being" over time doesn't mean it has the same moral properties at all times. The "substance view" seems to just assume that, yet no good reason is given to believe this.
/end
/end
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