Monday, July 7, 2025

“Abortion – A Human Right?” by Johannes Gonser

 Please summarize the attached file, evaluate its quality, and develop the most obvious criticisms.

ChatGPT said:

The document “Abortion – A Human Right?” by Johannes Gonser is a lengthy, systematic anti-abortion treatise that argues against the moral and legal permissibility of abortion. It presents a biological and philosophical case against abortion and defends a “substance-based” concept of personhood from conception.


✅ Summary

Thesis: Abortion is morally impermissible because unborn human beings are full human persons from conception, possessing a right to life equal to that of born people.

Structure:

  1. Preliminary Remarks:

    • Gonser opens with cultural criticism (e.g. society is hedonistic).

    • He critiques media bias and defends the value of respectful dialogue.

    • He distinguishes between biological human beings and persons with full moral status.

  2. Main Argument:

    • The author formulates a deductive argument:

      • (P1) Killing innocent persons is always wrong.

      • (P2) Unborn humans are innocent persons.

      • (P3) Abortion is intentional killing of unborn humans.

      • ∴ Abortion is always wrong.

  3. Scientific Foundations:

    • Claims conception marks the beginning of a unique human organism.

    • Asserts embryos exhibit immanent causation and self-direction.

  4. Critique of Functionalist Views (e.g., personhood based on mental capacities):

    • Rejects views tying moral status to consciousness, brain activity, viability, or desires.

    • Argues these criteria would also exclude newborns or severely disabled people.

  5. Substance-Based View:

    • Advocates that being human (biological membership in Homo sapiens with rational nature) grounds personhood.

    • Claims moral status comes from what we are (a rational kind), not what we can do.

  6. Critique of Bodily Autonomy Arguments:

    • Criticizes Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy and similar arguments.

    • Argues that pregnancy is not analogous to being kidnapped or hooked up to a stranger.

    • Defends the fetus’s right to the mother's body if it's the result of voluntary intercourse.

  7. Social and Psychological Claims:

    • Cites studies arguing that abortion does not improve mental health and may worsen it.

    • Disputes claims that banning abortion increases maternal mortality.

  8. Conclusion:

    • Argues abortion is unjustifiable even in difficult circumstances.

    • Suggests society must support pregnant women while respecting the fetus’s right to life.


🔍 Evaluation of Quality

Strengths:

  • Comprehensive: The paper covers biological, metaphysical, ethical, legal, and empirical dimensions.

  • Civility: Gonser stresses respectful engagement and avoids inflammatory rhetoric.

  • Sources: Includes both anti- and pro-choice scholars (e.g., Peter Singer, David Boonin, Mary Anne Warren, Diana Greene Foster).

  • Clarity: The core arguments are laid out clearly, especially the deductive structure.

Weaknesses:

  • Philosophical Assumptions:

    • Relies heavily on substance ontology—a contentious metaphysical view.

    • Assumes species membership is morally relevant without adequately addressing counterarguments about moral individualism.

  • Question-Begging:

    • The claim that fetuses have full moral status assumes what it needs to prove.

    • The analogy to adult persons being zygotes earlier presumes moral continuity without independent justification.

  • Selective Use of Science:

    • The appeal to fertilization as the beginning of personhood ignores the complexities of embryological development (e.g., monozygotic twinning, chimerism).

    • Overstates the scientific consensus—biological “human” status does not entail moral personhood.

  • Empirical Claims Are Contestable:

    • Cites studies suggesting abortion harms women, but these are debated and contradicted by other research.

    • Minimizes methodological criticisms of cited anti-abortion data.

  • Dismissiveness Toward Autonomy:

    • The critique of bodily autonomy often reduces women's rights to obligations of gestation, largely ignoring the burdens and risks of pregnancy.

    • Implies that voluntary sex equals consent to gestate—an assumption many find ethically problematic.

  • Inconsistency in Moral Reasoning:

    • Claims to avoid speciesism but grounds personhood in species membership.

    • Treats all killing of innocents as equally impermissible but makes exceptions (e.g., war).


⚠️ Most Obvious Criticisms

  1. Equivocation on “Human”:

    • Being biologically human ≠ being a moral person.

    • Gonser equates the zygote’s DNA with personhood, which is a metaphysical leap, not a scientific fact.

  2. Moral Status by Potentiality:

    • The argument that a being with the potential to develop rationality has full moral status is controversial.

    • Potential does not equal actuality in most moral reasoning (e.g., a potential doctor doesn’t have the rights of a licensed one).

  3. Ignores Women’s Rights:

    • The paper treats pregnant people as vessels with duties rather than autonomous agents.

    • There’s little serious engagement with the ethics of bodily integrity or the harms of forced gestation.

  4. Implies Infanticide or Animal Rights to Avoid Implications:

    • Claims pro-choice views lead to acceptance of infanticide or animal rights, but this is a false dilemma.

    • Ethical distinctions between abortion and infanticide (e.g., birth as a morally significant event) are not fairly addressed.

  5. Dismisses Viability, Sentience, and Consciousness:

    • These are ethically significant to many thinkers, yet Gonser dismisses them as arbitrary without fully refuting their moral relevance.

  6. Bias Toward Absolutism:

    • No allowance for rape, incest, or threats to maternal life.

    • Such rigidity may strike many readers as morally implausible and inhumane.


📝 Conclusion

Gonser’s essay is a well-organized and serious anti-abortion argument, rooted in biological essentialism and substance metaphysics. While it avoids inflammatory language and engages with some opposing views, it suffers from deep philosophical and empirical weaknesses, particularly in its assumptions about personhood, autonomy, and moral relevance. Its rejection of functional criteria for personhood, while coherent in its own framework, leads to implausible conclusions and neglects the real-world stakes and experiences of pregnant individuals.

Wednesday, June 11, 2025

Separating conjoined twins cases

People sometimes propose cases like this.  

A and B are conjoined twins. In order to surgically disconnect from each other safely, they must wait 9 months. However, A can initiate the surgery now, directly causing the death of B. Is it morally permissible for A to disconnect from B?

I don't think such people think very hard about these cases though and what they think they suggest. Due to a lack of time and other things to do now, I asked ChatGPT about such cases:

Suppose there were adult conjoined twins, who both are persons, yet seem to share one body. Suppose they could be separated but one would die. Does the one who wants to separate have a moral or legal right to separate--especially given that the other twin will die--on any leading ethical or legal theories of bodily rights?
ChatGPT said:

This is a profoundly difficult ethical and legal question, and different moral and legal theories would approach it in distinct ways. The case pits one person's right to bodily autonomy against another person's right to life, under extraordinarily unique conditions. Let's break it down from multiple perspectives:


🔍 Background: The Scenario

  • Two adult conjoined twins, both persons with independent minds, desires, and (presumably) legal standing.

  • They share one body, or much of one body.

  • Separation is medically possible, but one will inevitably die if they are separated.

  • One twin wants to be separated, the other does not, because it will result in their death.


🧠 Ethical Frameworks

1. Bodily Autonomy (Liberal Individual Rights)

This principle holds that each person has the ultimate right to decide what happens to their body.

Challenge: In conjoined twins, the body is shared—so there is no purely "individual" body. The separation would involve modifying and destroying body parts that sustain the other twin.

  • Twin A's autonomy supports the right to request separation.

  • Twin B’s autonomy supports the right not to be killed or have their bodily support removed.

  • Analogy: It's like unplugging a life-support system that’s not merely passive—it's part of someone else's body.

🟡 Verdict: Inconclusive or against separation. Twin A’s right to autonomy is limited by Twin B’s right to life and equal claim to the shared body.


2. Doctrine of Double Effect (Thomistic / Catholic Ethics)

This principle allows an action that causes a serious harm (like death) as a side effect of pursuing a good end, if the harm is not intended.

Application: If the goal is not to kill Twin B, but to allow Twin A independence, is that morally permissible?

Problem: The death is not just foreseen—it is certain and directly caused by the act of separation. That typically fails the test.

🔴 Verdict: Against separation. The death of Twin B is not merely a side effect; it's intrinsic to the act.


3. Utilitarianism (Consequentialism)

What action brings about the greatest overall happiness or least suffering?

Factors:

  • Does Twin A's future happiness outweigh Twin B’s death?

  • Would separation bring peace or trauma to both?

  • Are there others (family, society) impacted by the result?

Problem: Very difficult to calculate. Most versions would not justify the certain death of a person who wants to live.

🔴 Verdict: Likely against separation, unless Twin A's life would be otherwise unbearable and Twin B’s life marginally fulfilling.


4. Rights-Based Theories

If both individuals have a right to life, and neither has a superior claim to the shared body, then forcing death on one violates their rights.

Example Analogy: The famous Thomson violinist analogy (used in abortion ethics) offers some insight. In that case, you’re attached to a famous violinist and must stay connected to keep them alive. Thomson argues you have no obligation.

However, this analogy does not quite fit here:

  • The twins share organs from birth (not forcibly attached later).

  • They both have a mutual claim to the body, unlike the violinist.

🟡 Verdict: Mixed; but probably against separation, because unlike abortion cases, Twin B’s death is not just a withdrawal of support—it’s an active killing via shared-body surgery.


5. Legal Considerations

Courts generally:

  • Uphold bodily autonomy, but also

  • Protect the right to life of every person.

In past conjoined twin cases (e.g., the 2000 UK case Re A (Children)), the court permitted separation, even though one twin would die—but that was a case of infants, and the dying twin was non-conscious and dependent.

Here, both twins are adults, both competent, and one actively objects.

🟥 Verdict: Separation likely not legally permitted. Courts would likely find that separating them intentionally causes the death of an unwilling, competent adult.


⚖️ Summary of Theories and Verdicts

TheoryLikely VerdictReason
Bodily Autonomy⚖️ MixedEach twin has equal claim; autonomy doesn't justify killing the other.
Double Effect❌ NoDeath is intentional and direct.
Utilitarianism❌ or ⚖️Death outweighs uncertain gains.
Rights-Based❌ NoRight to life trumps autonomous harm to others.
Legal (Western)❌ NoKilling a competent adult, even to free another, is unlawful.

🧩 Final Thought

The situation reveals a tragic moral impasse: both individuals are equally entitled to life and freedom, but the physical reality makes it impossible to respect both without sacrificing one. Most ethical and legal frameworks would say you cannot kill one person to free another, even if that person wants their freedom desperately.

If you'd like, I can help you explore this through a case study format, fictional narrative, or even help formulate arguments for a bioethics or law paper.

You said:
In a way this seems like a hypothetical case where there is a fence equally on the border of a property: neither owner of the property built the fence, but one wants it gone and the other does not. Who has the right to make the decision, given it will affect both?
ChatGPT said:

That’s a very apt analogy—and it reveals the ethical structure of the conjoined twins dilemma quite well.

Let’s unpack it.


🧱 Fence Analogy

Scenario:

  • A fence lies exactly on the property line between two neighbors.

  • Neither built it.

  • One neighbor wants it removed (perhaps they find it ugly or restrictive).

  • The other wants it to stay (perhaps it offers privacy or emotional attachment).

  • Removing it will affect both, as it is shared.


🔍 Legal Analogy: Shared Ownership or Easement

In property law, a fence on the boundary is usually treated as jointly owned, unless there's a clear deed or agreement saying otherwise. That means:

  • Neither party can unilaterally remove or alter it without the other’s consent.

  • To take it down, both parties must agree, or one must get a court order proving special circumstances (e.g., the fence causes harm or violates some code).

So in the legal case:

"Shared property requires shared decisions."


🧠 Ethical Parallels to the Conjoined Twin Case

  • The fence is like the shared body or organs.

  • Neither twin built the body, just like neither neighbor built the fence.

  • One wants “removal” (separation)—but that will destroy what the other needs to survive (privacy / function / life).

  • The other wants things to remain as they are.


⚖️ Key Shared Insight

In both the fence and conjoined twins cases:

  • Each party has an equal claim to the thing in question (fence / body).

  • One’s use or removal of the shared element affects the other severely.

  • So the party who wants to make the change must justify it not just by their own rights, but in light of the harm to the other.


🟥 Conclusion

In both ethics and law, when a shared entity is at stake:

  • Unilateral action that harms the other party’s core interests (like bodily survival or property enjoyment) is generally not justified.

  • Rights over shared things are not the same as rights over wholly private ones.

So yes—your fence analogy works very well to illustrate the logic behind why most theories would deny the right to separate the twins, just as neither neighbor can tear down the fence on their own.

Would you like help refining this analogy into a formal argument or analogy-based essay structure?