"Humans have human rights because they are human"

ChatGPT: Did folks who came up with "Humans have human rights because they are human" think about how the first and - especially - the last 'human' here might be misinterpreted?

"Human" here doesn't mean "biologically human" or even "biologically human organism."

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Yes, many philosophers and legal theorists who formulated or defended the idea that "humans have human rights because they are human" were aware of potential ambiguities in the term human. The first and last use of human in that phrase can be interpreted in different ways, which can lead to confusion or even misrepresentation of the argument.

1. First 'Human' (Who Has Rights?) – If "human" here refers to any biologically human organism, then the claim would imply that all human organisms, regardless of their stage of development (e.g., zygotes, embryos, fetuses) or cognitive capacities (e.g., those in persistent vegetative states), automatically possess rights. But many philosophers argue that rights are based on personhood, moral agency, or other capacities rather than mere biological humanity.

2. Last 'Human' (Why Do They Have Rights?) – If "human" in this position simply means "biologically human," then the claim risks being circular or trivial: "Humans have rights because they are members of the species Homo sapiens." But this doesn't explain why being human is morally relevant. Most human rights theories ground rights in factors like rationality, autonomy, dignity, or interests—not just species membership.

Many thinkers (e.g., Kant, Rawls, and contemporary bioethicists) carefully distinguish between biological humanity and moral humanity (e.g., personhood). Some critics even argue that species membership alone cannot be a sufficient basis for rights, as this would commit the speciesist fallacy—treating Homo sapiens as morally special simply because they belong to a certain species rather than due to morally relevant traits.

Did you have a specific thinker or debate in mind, or are you thinking about how this phrase is used in public discourse?

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Ok good but historically who had this concern about "human" being misunderstood?

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Historically, concerns about the ambiguity of human in moral and legal contexts can be traced back at least to the Enlightenment, though they became more explicit in the 20th and 21st centuries. Here are some key figures and debates where this issue surfaced:

1. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) – While Bentham didn’t explicitly discuss the ambiguity of human, he critiqued natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts" because they seemed to be based on vague, undefined notions of human nature. His utilitarianism shifted the focus from mere species membership to sentience and the capacity for pleasure and pain.

2. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) – Kant distinguished between biological humanity and moral humanity (rational agency, autonomy). His idea that dignity and moral worth come from rationality, not just being human, suggests an early awareness that human in moral discourse needed clarification.

3. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) – Mill emphasized capacities like rationality and self-awareness over mere biological species membership when discussing moral and political rights. His work hints at concerns about species-based definitions of rights.

4. Legal Debates on Slavery and Personhood (18th–19th Century) – In cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the question of whether certain humans had legal standing as "persons" showed how the term human could be politically and legally contested.

5. Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) – In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt discussed how mere biological humanity was insufficient for securing rights—what mattered was recognition within a political community. Stateless persons, despite being biologically human, often lacked basic rights.

6. Peter Singer (b. 1946) and the Personhood Debate – Singer explicitly challenges the idea that all Homo sapiens automatically have rights simply by being human, arguing that moral status should depend on characteristics like self-awareness and suffering. His critiques of speciesism highlight the potential confusion in grounding rights purely in biological humanity.

7. Contemporary Bioethics and Abortion Debates – Philosophers like Mary Anne Warren, Michael Tooley, and Judith Jarvis Thomson have all grappled with whether fetuses (or even newborns, in Tooley’s case) qualify as humans in the morally relevant sense. Their work underscores the importance of distinguishing biological humanity from moral personhood.

So while earlier thinkers might not have explicitly stated, “the word human is being misused,” many of them implicitly recognized the problem by arguing that rights require more than just species membership. Do you think the issue is more pressing today than in past centuries?

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Did anyone think about this type of concern in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

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Yes, concerns about how human might be interpreted were present during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. While the drafters did not explicitly debate the ambiguity of the word human in the way contemporary philosophers do, they were deeply aware that the justification for human rights could not rest solely on species membership or biological definitions.

Here are some key moments and figures related to this issue:

1. The Need for a Universal Basis for Rights

• The drafters of the UDHR, including thinkers like René Cassin, Charles Malik, and Peng Chun Chang, debated how to justify rights universally without relying on specific religious, cultural, or biological foundations.
• There was concern that if rights were simply grounded in being a biological human, this might not provide a robust moral or legal basis—especially given the Nazi regime’s pseudo-scientific racial classifications that excluded some humans from moral consideration.

2. The Role of Personhood and Dignity

• The phrase "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (Article 1) was chosen carefully. The emphasis on dignity suggests that what matters is not just being a member of Homo sapiens but possessing qualities tied to moral agency, rationality, and autonomy.
• Jacques Maritain, a Thomist philosopher who influenced the drafting process, argued that rights should be based on the intrinsic dignity of persons, not just their biological status.

3. Avoiding Exclusionary Interpretations

• The drafters were aware that defining human too narrowly (e.g., linking rights only to rationality or legal personhood) could exclude vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities or those in extreme poverty.
• Conversely, they also resisted defining human too broadly in a way that might justify rights for non-persons or non-humans.

4. Later Clarifications and Debates

• Over time, legal scholars and philosophers have debated whether the UDHR’s concept of human should include embryos, fetuses, or even certain non-human animals (e.g., great apes).
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) further clarified that the right to life (Article 6) applies to "every human being", but legal interpretations have varied on whether this includes unborn humans.

Was the Ambiguity Intentional?

Yes, to some extent. The drafters wanted the UDHR to have broad appeal across cultures and ideologies, so they deliberately avoided grounding human rights in any single religious, philosophical, or scientific doctrine. This left some terms, like human, open to interpretation—allowing for evolving moral and legal discussions.

Do you think this ambiguity weakens the UDHR’s force, or does it allow for necessary flexibility?

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Where can I learn more about this issue?

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To explore the issue of how human was interpreted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and related debates, you might check out the following sources:

1. Primary Sources on the UDHR

The Travaux Préparatoires (Drafting History) – The official records of the UDHR’s drafting discussions are available in archives and legal databases. A good starting point is:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires (eds. William A. Schabas & Hélène Tigroudja).

The UN Audiovisual Library of International Law (https://legal.un.org/avl/) has materials on the drafting process.

Eleanor Roosevelt’s writings – As the chair of the drafting committee, Roosevelt’s writings and speeches provide insight into the philosophical challenges of defining human rights.

2. Books on Human Rights Philosophy

James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights – Discusses the foundations of human rights and the ambiguities in defining human.

Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights – Explores how historical ideas of humanity influenced modern human rights.

Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights – Covers philosophical and political debates surrounding human rights.

3. Articles on the Concept of ‘Human’ in Human Rights

John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights (2007) – A deep dive into the philosophical basis of human rights, questioning whether biological humanity is enough.

Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights – Discusses how human rights function politically rather than metaphysically.

Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History – Challenges the assumption that human rights are grounded in universal humanity.

4. Debates on Personhood vs. Biological Humanity

Peter Singer, Practical Ethics – Argues that rights should be based on personhood rather than species membership.

Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice – Discusses human dignity in the context of disability, animal rights, and global justice.

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights – A defense of a more classical view of human rights grounded in natural law.

Would you like recommendations for a particular angle—legal, historical, or more philosophical?

FYI:

Men and Abortion

Men and women both have something to offer to the abortion debate.

Lane Taylor

Also see:

Saturday, October 3, 2020

Pro-life virtues and vices? Pro-choice virtues and vices? On sex/gender and arguments

Is Abortion "Healthcare" and Does That Even Matter?

FYI, Is Abortion "Healthcare" and Does That Even Matter? at https://responsiblethinker.substack.com/p/is-abortion-healthcare-and-does-that 

Also see Is abortion "healthcare"? What if it often is not? at https://www.abortionarguments.com/2020/10/is-abortion-healthcare.html 

Response to a comment on "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping or comatose people??!"

Someone posted a comment on another post "If abortion is not wrong, then it's OK to kill sleeping or comatose people??!"  Since the comment got divided in two, I am reposting it here: I will post the full comment and then responses in the text of the comment below:

Hi Dr Nobis,

My last two comments weren't approved, so I'll repost them.

Your principle is that "If a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being."

You seem to base this on the following two arguments:

Argument A

A1. A fetus is a human organism that does not currently contain a personal identity but will in the future.
A2. All human organisms that do not currently contain a personal identity but will in the future are typically permissible to kill.
A3. So, a fetus is typically permissible to kill.

Argument B (from the article "Does Abortion Harm the Fetus" on Utilitas, which you have referenced several times)

B1. A fetus is a human organism with a lifetime wellbeing that is currently unmeasurable but which will be measurable in the future.
- Supporting B1: Its lifetime wellbeing is unmeasurable because its current temporal wellbeing is unmeasurable.
B2. All human organisms with a lifetime wellbeing that is currently unmeasurable but which will be measurable in the future are typically permissible to kill.
B3. So, a fetus is typically permissible to kill.

However, neither of A2 or B2 are intuitive or well known moral principles, A2 is subject to counterexamples, and B1 seems untrue.

A2 is subject to the following counterexamples:
- a person who consumes a poison which induces total memory loss and a temporary coma.
- a baby born in a temporary coma.
- the common real world case of a baby that is born in respiratory distress then intubated and placed in an induced coma, which likely will experience retrograde amnesia upon waking up.

These counterexamples would lead many people to reject A2. If A2 were true, then it would be wrong of us to ban killing the humans involved (with the consent of their family members) and harvesting their organs to save other people, because we would be neglecting the pressing interests of humans that really do have interests and a right to life and banning a morally permissible action (you make a similar argument in your Salon article to argue that abortion restrictions are unjust). You write about theories of personal identity, but those are descriptive theories, not normative ones, and nothing about believing that a comatose human who has their memory wiped may be a new "person" after waking up entails believing they are also permissible to kill. 

B1 seems untrue because healthy functioning and good future prospects seem like components of wellbeing which can be measured. It seems that you can measure the current temporal wellbeing level of a sleeping or comatose person, and it can take a turn for better or for worse. I mean their current wellbeing, not their lifetime wellbeing. For example, a comatose person in ICU whose renal function is rapidly deteriorating and whose prospects for recovery are diminishing could be said to have deteriorating wellbeing, whilst a sleeping person who will wake up to good health in a few hours could be said to have a better state of wellbeing. The Utilitas article assumes that immediate consciousness is needed for wellbeing to be measurable at a given point in time, but many would dispute that, and nothing like a deductive proof for this position is offered by the authors. This is only one of many criticisms that could be levied at the article.

Because neither argument that you offer in support of your principle is definitive (or even seems persuasive), you can't reasonably exclude the significant possibility that most abortions are seriously wrong. There is no good reason to think that psychological connection to past experiences is needed for FLO to apply. That leads on to the following analogy which would support restricting abortions, even if you don't fully accept Marquis' argument.

1. Suppose you have multiple sclerosis and can press a button which will cure yourself of it, but there is a significant possibility that pressing the button will also kill your sleeping newborn baby, who you plan to give up for adoption.
2. It would be seriously wrong to press the button, even though doing so would cure you of a significant medical condition.
3. Most abortions are similar in relevant ways to the button case, because there is a significant possibility that killing a fetus is morally equivalent to killing a sleeping newborn baby.
4. So, most abortions are seriously wrong.

Responses in the text of the comment below at ###:

Hi Dr Nobis,

My last two comments weren't approved, so I'll repost them.

Your principle is that "If a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being."

You seem to base this on the following two arguments:

Argument A
A1. A fetus is a human organism that does not currently contain a personal identity but will in the future.

### It's very important that you specific an early, pre-conscious fetus. But, yes, such a mere body is not numerically identical with a person on psychological theories of personal identity, which are the most widely accepted views on these matters. 

I am going to observe that the phrase "contain a personal identity" is odd: you may want to be saying something about how something is (or is not) numerically identical to some future stage of that being or something like that. 

It's also important to note that it's not that a fetus will "contain" a person, so to speak, but that it usually can. If the fetus dies, it will not, but it could.

A2. All human organisms that do not currently contain a personal identity but will in the future are typically permissible to kill.

### Again, the "can" is important: if they are killed, then will not! So what's being said here is a bit incoherent: if killed, it will not be numerically identical to some future being, although it could have. 

A3. So, a fetus is typically permissible to kill.

### The basic idea here is just that an embryo is not a conscious subject and has not been, and so there's no experiencing being that has a quality of life that can take a turn for the worse or end; so there's no morally significant individual who can be harmed.  

Argument B (from the article "Does Abortion Harm the Fetus" on Utilitas, which you have referenced several times)
B1. A fetus is a human organism with a lifetime wellbeing that is currently unmeasurable but which will be measurable in the future.

### Again, the "can" is important: if the fetus is killed, then it will not!

- Supporting B1: Its lifetime wellbeing is unmeasurable because its current temporal wellbeing is unmeasurable.

### I am not sure what's going on here: "its current temporal wellbeing is unmeasurable" because there is no current wellbeing level: there's nothing to measure: it's not doing well, and not doing poorly either. And how is a "current temporal wellbeing" level different from a "current wellbeing" level? Is there a difference there?

B2. All human organisms with a lifetime wellbeing that is currently unmeasurable but which will be measurable in the future are typically permissible to kill.

### Again, the "can" is important: if they are killed, then will not!

B3. So, a fetus is typically permissible to kill.

### If this is intended to be a reconstruction of the main argument from that article, this does not  appear to be accurate or informative. 

However, neither of A2 or B2 are intuitive or well known moral principles, A2 is subject to counterexamples, and B1 seems untrue.

A2 [A2. All human organisms that do not currently contain a personal identity but will in the future are typically permissible to kill.] is subject to the following counterexamples:

### For what it's worth, I don't think these are good cases to test these principles with since--due to their controversial nature--- people's intuitions about them will likely be the same as their intuitions about, say, embryos. And the reasons they might give for their intuitions will likely be the same they'd give about their views on, say, embryos. 

- a person who consumes a poison which induces total memory loss and a temporary coma.

### I discussed such a case here -- https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article-abstract/36/3/261/895026?redirectedFrom=fulltext -- but this doesn't seem to be readily available anymore. 

Basically, this is a case where an adult, born person is basically "transformed" into something like an embryo, due to their total memory loss and so loss of any relation to the prior person that was "in" their body. So, whatever you think about embryos you'd say here, and so it's not a great case. 

- a baby born in a temporary coma.
- the common real world case of a baby that is born in respiratory distress then intubated and placed in an induced coma, which likely will experience retrograde amnesia upon waking up.

### Here was this discussion from 2021:

3. The "Comatose Newborn Baby" Objection

Finally, there's an objection that is based on a case like this:

A baby is born, in a coma. That baby has never been conscious. But that baby will become conscious . . eventually. 

The argument then is that if the "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is true, then it's not wrong to end the life of this baby. But since, they say, it would be wrong to end the life of this baby, the "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is false and so the original argument just isn't a good argument in defense of abortion.

I don't think this objection succeeds. 

First, the case is basically a unique baby that, for all practical purposes, is just like a beginning fetuses in all its relevant features: the claim is basically, "Killing fetuses that have never had minds is wrong because killing a born baby that has never had a mind would be wrong also" and so the reasoning is close to circular. In that way, the argument is question-begging, or assumes that the principle it is trying to argue against is false in making a case that it's false, if the reasoning amounts to something like this:

This "if a being is not conscious, and has never been conscious, then it's typically permissible to kill that being" principle is false because there could be this comotose "baby" and even though that baby is not conscious, and has never been conscious, that "baby" would be wrong to kill. 

If this is the reaction, it basically amounts to just assuming the principle is false.  

Next, the reactions to the case that it would be wrong to led this never-been-conscious baby die, or kill this baby, are, I think, emotion-driven: people picture in their minds a more normal baby—who would be wrong to kill, since that baby is conscious, aware and has feelings—and those feelings transfer to this "baby," which is nothing like a normal baby, even though they really shouldn't transfer. And this emotional distortion can lead people to overlook these important questions:

• Would anyone be harmed if the "baby" were killed? 
• No, there is no conscious individual here who would be made worse off, compared to how they were, if this body were killed: this case is very different from killing a normal baby since, again, this baby is just like an early fetus, just bigger and born.  
• Would any person be killed if the "baby" were killed? 
• No, there is no conscious individual here who would be killed, although killing this body would prevent the emergence of a future person. 

So, again, the case does not provide a good reason to reject this type of pro-choice argument: it seems to just assume that what it's arguing against is false, instead of giving a reason that the principle is false (and a reason which doesn't just assume it's false).   

Next, the case is very different from abortion, so one could agree that it'd be wrong to let the "baby" die but deny that anything follows about abortion.  

For one, the comatose newborn "baby" is no longer dependent on anyone in particular, and anyone's body in particular: anyone could take care of this baby. So, one could plausibly think that, all things considered, this matters and makes a difference: yes, someone, or someones, has to take care of this "baby," given the situation, but pregnant women are not obligated to "take care of" pre-conscious fetuses that are in their bodies and so only they can take care of them: that's too much of a burden which they don't have to take on if they don't want to. 

It is a fair question, however, to ask about details about the case: in particular, how long would it take for the baby to become conscious? What if it's 50 years? 80 years? Does that matter? Inquiring minds would want to know. Maybe there'd be a point where people would concede that the time is too much and so the lack of harm here really does matter and so it'd also matter with a shorter time period too. 

Next, I think it's important to observe that this "baby" is quite different from a beginning fetus in that it is, as the case is intended, very close to being conscious. And maybe that's an important difference. It's like this:

Suppose I've been studying to get into law school, and I'm doing well, but this is very much because of your help in keeping me on track, encouraging me, quizzing me, and more: I literally couldn't do it without you. You've been helping me for years now, and I've almost made it, since the LSAT (test to get into law school) is in a month and I will do well if, but only if, you keep helping me. 

Now, it's within your rights to stop helping me, even if I lose out on my dream of going to law school. But shouldn't you keep helping me, unless there's some real good reason why you shouldn't (like I become mean or ungrateful or ..)? I mean, we've come this far; let's finish this! If you had backed out on all this years ago, that'd be one thing, but we're almost to the end here! Let's finish this so I can make my dream come true!

If this case has a moral or a point (and maybe it doesn't!) then it might transfer to the comatose baby—since that baby body is almost conscious and so maybe there is some obligation at this point to make that happen. That intuition, however, won't transfer to a beginning fetus. 

So, all and all, the "comatose newborn baby" objection is not a good one, given the differences and the similarities between this "baby" and beginning fetuses and pregnant women. 

####

These counterexamples would lead many people to reject A2 [ [A2. All human organisms that do not currently contain a personal identity but will {update: CAN} in the future are typically permissible to kill.].

### Well, the big question here about these (hard?) cases is what sort of reasons can be given for them to support anyone's intuitive judgements. 

If A2 were true, then it would be wrong of us to ban killing the humans involved (with the consent of their family members) and harvesting their organs to save other people, because we would be neglecting the pressing interests of humans that really do have interests and a right to life and banning a morally permissible action (you make a similar argument in your Salon article to argue that abortion restrictions are unjust). You write about theories of personal identity, but those are descriptive theories, not normative ones, and nothing about believing that a comatose human who has their memory wiped may be a new "person" after waking up entails believing they are also permissible to kill. 

### Yes, it's correct that observing that the standard reasons why it's wrong to, say, kill sleeping people do not apply in these cases does not entail that it's OK to kill these beings. But no thoughtful person would claim that: again, they'd observe that the standard reasons don't apply and then ask if there are other reasons to think that such killings would be wrong. Either such reasons can be identified or not. If not, one might think that this judgment isn't supported: it's a mere intuition, but not one that can be supported by good reasons. 

B1 seems untrue because healthy functioning and good future prospects seem like components of wellbeing which can be measured. It seems that you can measure the current temporal wellbeing level of a sleeping or comatose person, and it can take a turn for better or for worse. I mean their current wellbeing, not their lifetime wellbeing. For example, a comatose person in ICU whose renal function is rapidly deteriorating and whose prospects for recovery are diminishing could be said to have deteriorating wellbeing, whilst a sleeping person who will wake up to good health in a few hours could be said to have a better state of wellbeing.

### OK. And these cases differ from, say, an embryo how? The most obvious answer is that what happens to these bodies matters because of how it's going to affect the person--the person who was and, we hope, will continue existing. 

The Utilitas article assumes that immediate consciousness is needed for wellbeing to be measurable at a given point in time,

### I don't know about that: everyone knows that human people sleep and so all discussions of these topics should be able to accommodate this obvious fact.

but many would dispute that, and nothing like a deductive proof

### I am not sure why you are seeking (deductive) "proofs" here: do any arguments given about controversial ethical and philosophical issues amount to "proofs"? 

for this position is offered by the authors. This is only one of many criticisms that could be levied at the article.

### Perhaps you should write up a careful reply article.

Because neither argument that you offer in support of your principle is definitive (or even seems persuasive), you can't reasonably exclude the significant possibility that most abortions are seriously wrong. There is no good reason to think that psychological connection to past experiences is needed for FLO to apply.

### Well, you are saying there's no good reason here based on some judgments about some controversial and potentially genuinely hard cases. And these are cases that, while people have intuitive judgments about them, those judgments are not super easy to justify anyway, on any more theoretical views (including, say, so called "substance" views), especially without leading to other judgments that are not intuitive to many people. 

That leads on to the following analogy which would support restricting abortions, even if you don't fully accept Marquis' argument.

1. Suppose you have multiple sclerosis and can press a button which will cure yourself of it, but there is a significant possibility that pressing the button will also kill your sleeping newborn baby, who you plan to give up for adoption.
2. It would be seriously wrong to press the button, even though doing so would cure you of a significant medical condition.
3. Most abortions are similar in relevant ways to the button case, because there is a significant possibility that killing a fetus is morally equivalent to killing a sleeping newborn baby.
4. So, most abortions are seriously wrong.

### I don't see this as a very relevant analogous case, but I am going to suggest that you run this by other people to get their reactions. I do, suggest, that you explain why these cases might be relevantly similar. I do think that being cautious makes good sense, but I do think that people  often don't accept that in a serious, consistent way: see Abortion, Animals, & the Precautionary Principle

### OK, this is some response. I hope it helps!

Don Marquis on abortion: the "future like ours" argument

Don Marquis on abortion: the "future like ours" argument:

More here:

1000-Word Philosophy:

4. Valuable Futures?

Abortion might seem to prevent a fetus from experiencing its valuable future, just like killing us does, even if it is not yet a person.6 But our futures might be valuable, in part, because we can, presently, look forward to them. Fetuses have no awareness of their futures whatsoever, and this is one important difference between their futures and our futures.

Further, an egg-and-a-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it arguably has a future akin to that of a fetus. Contraception (even by abstinence!) keeps this future from materializing.7 But contraception and abstinence aren’t wrong. Thus, it is not wrong to perform some action that prevents such a future from materializing.

Thinking Critically About Abortion:

5.1.5 Abortion prevents fetuses from experiencing their valuable futures

The argument against abortion that is likely most-discussed by philosophers comes from philosopher Don Marquis.^[14] He argues that it is wrong to kill us, typical adults and children, because it deprives us from experiencing our (expected to be) valuable futures, which is a great loss to us. He argues that since fetuses also have valuable futures (“futures like ours” he calls them), they are also wrong to kill. His argument has much to recommend it, but there are reasons to doubt it as well.

First, fetuses don’t seem to have futures like our futures, since—as they are pre-conscious—they are entirely psychologically disconnected from any future experiences: there is no (even broken) chain of experiences from the fetus to that future person’s experiences. Babies are, at least, aware of the current moment, which leads to the next moment; children and adults think about and plan for their futures, but fetuses cannot do these things, being completely unconscious and without a mind.

Second, this fact might even mean that the early fetus doesn’t literally have a future: if your future couldn’t include you being a merely physical, non-conscious object (e.g., you couldn’t be a corpse: if there’s a corpse, you are gone), then non-conscious physical objects, like a fetus, couldn’t literally be a future person.^[15] If this is correct, early fetuses don’t even have futures, much less futures like ours. Something would have a future, like ours, only when there is someone there to be psychologically connected to that future: that someone arrives later in pregnancy, after when most abortions occur.

A third objection is more abstract and depends on the “metaphysics” of objects. It begins with the observation that there are single objects with parts with space between them. Indeed almost every object is like this, if you could look close enough: it’s not just single dinette sets, since there is literally some space between the parts of most physical objects. From this, it follows that there seem to be single objects such as an-egg-and-the-sperm-that-would-fertilize-it. And these would also seem to have a future of value, given how Marquis describes this concept. (It should be made clear that sperm and eggs alone do not have futures of value, and Marquis does not claim they do: this is not the objection here). The problem is that contraception, even by abstinence, prevents that thing’s future of value from materializing, and so seems to be wrong when we use Marquis’s reasoning. Since contraception is not wrong, but his general premise suggests that it is, it seems that preventing something from experiencing its valuable future isn’t always wrong and so Marquis’s argument appears to be unsound.^[16]

Are Fetuses "Innocent Human Beings"?

 An excellent discussion by Lane Taylor! See here for better formatting; the cut and paste didn't work so well here:

https://responsiblethinker.substack.com/p/are-fetuses-innocent-human-beings 

Responsible Thinker

Are Fetuses "Innocent Human Beings"?

“It is always wrong to kill an innocent human being. Abortion kills an innocent human being, therefore it is wrong.”

This is the premier ethical argument against abortion in mainstream discourse on the subject. To many pro-life people, the premises of this argument are stunningly obvious. So obvious, in fact, is the supposed truth of these premises, that many pro-life people believe that only the self-deceived or the vicious would deny them. Despite appearances, this argument is hopelessly flawed. It just takes a little bit to explain why.

1 - The Innocence Claim


The argument makes two claims about fetuses; it says they are

Innocent; and


Human Beings.

Let’s start with the claim that fetuses are innocent. The word “innocent” is polysemous; it has multiple meanings that are quite different from each other. I’ll list a few of the most common meanings here:

Adjective - not guilty of a crime or offense.


Adjective - not responsible for an event yet suffering it’s consequences.


Adjective - without experience or knowledge of.


Adjective - free from moral wrong or corruption.


Noun - A pure, guiless, or naive person.


Noun - A person involved by chance in a situation, especially a victim of crime or war.

Let’s go through, these one by one.

1- Fetuses are indeed innocent on this definition, but in a morally insignificant way. Rocks, trees, dirt, and e-coli are all not guilty of a crime or offense because they are not agents. There mere fact that a being is not guilty of a crime or offense is not morally significant.

2 - It is not obviously true that fetuses are innocent in this sense, and the argument comes dangerously close to question-begging if this sense is used. Fetuses are certainly not responsible agents, but whether they can “suffer” is another matter.

The word “suffer” itself has multiple meanings. One morally laden sense is that of suffering pain or intense discomfort. At least at a certain point in the fetus’s development, nothing like consciousness is online yet, and so many fetuses cannot suffer pain or discomfort - many fetuses do not literally feel pain or discomfort (though later fetuses may).

Another morally laden sense of the word suffer is that of suffering a loss. We might say - after my identity has been stolen - that I suffered a great loss. This implies that I had a right or moral claim to the thing I lost, however. To say that fetuses can suffer in this sense would be to claim that they have a right or moral claim to something (probably life, as abortion is a killing). If the fetus lost something it did not have a right or moral claim to, then the “suffering” would not be morally problematic.

While a use of this sense of the word “innocent” in the above argument is not strictly question begging, it is dangerously close to it. We are just loading in a premise that says that fetuses have moral rights or valid moral claims. Maybe they do, but you might as well just give a different argument for why you think they can suffer a moral loss rather than saying they’re innocent in the sense considered here. To call fetuses “innocent” in the sense just considered would be to - knowingly or unknowingly - hide a contentious moral claim behind a word that pumps our intuitions to think of babies and children.

3 - Fetuses are innocent on this definition, but in a morally insignificant way. Trees, rocks, dirt, and e-coli are all without experience or knowledge. If we change the definition to say an “innocent” is a person without experience or knowledge, then we are once again loading a wildly contentious moral premise into our argument and disguising it in language that makes it appear far less controversial than it actually is. The premise that fetuses are persons needs its own defense - if you have an argument for the position that fetuses are persons, just use that argument instead of this “innocent human being” argument, because the claim that fetuses are persons is what really needs a defense.

4 - The same explanation from 1 and 3 apply here - inanimate objects are free from moral corruption. If you change the definition (as I think some people unconsciously do) to mean a person that is free from moral corruption, you may as well just argue directly for the claim that fetuses are persons.

5 - Once again, our definition contains a personhood claim.

6 - Once again, our definition contains a personhood claim.

As you can see, definitions of the term “innocent” either make the fetus an innocent in a sense that is morally insignificant, or they claim the fetus is a person. Under these latter definitions, the contentious claim that fetuses are persons is hidden by language that primes us to think of beings that are undeniably persons but significantly different from fetuses (babies and children). I think many people use these personhood style definitions without even realizing it, and this causes lots of confusion. If you think fetuses are persons, just argue for that claim directly instead of claiming they’re persons in a roundabout, confusing way by calling them “innocent”.

2 - The Human Being Claim


Let’s move on to the claim that fetuses are human beings.

We might say that a human being just a being (an existing thing) that is biologically human. On this definition, the fetus is definitely a human being. It exists, and it’s not a dolphin fetus or a fetus of some non-human species. Another definition: a human being is a human organism. On this definition too, fetuses are human beings. Fetuses are alive and they are organisms.

Both of these senses are not morally significant. Imagine a being that looks and behaves exactly like a human, but that is not conscious. It has no thoughts, feelings, desires, experiences, or other mental states, or anything else like these things. It will also never have these things, ex hypothesi. Such a being would be an organism, but it would have no moral status. It would not be wrong to kill such a being, as it has no well-being level and lacks the properties which would endow it with rights or moral status

A third definition is: a human being is a human person. The concept of a person is different from the concept of an organism. For example, you can imagine a sentient robot with thoughts, feelings, and desires. Such a being would be a person, but not an organism. So not all persons are organisms. Similarly, not all organisms are persons. Imagine a being that looks and behaves exactly like a human, but that is not conscious. It has no thoughts, feelings, desires, experiences, or other mental states, or anything else like these things. It will also never have these things, ex hypothesi. Such a being would be an organism, but not a person.

The view that fetuses are persons is morally significant - “person” is a moral category. Persons are beings that we owe at least some moral duties to - they are the sorts of beings for whom life can go better or worse. They are the sorts of beings who have rights and valid moral claims. On this definition, it is controversial whether fetuses are human beings, because it is controversial whether fetuses are persons. My personal answer is no, but there is room for disagreement.

Crucially, however, on this definition of “human being”, to claim that a fetus is a human being is just to claim that it is a person. It is poor form to simply assert this in your argument against abortion - this is precisely the claim that needs a defense! The view that fetuses are the sorts of beings whom it is seriously wrong to kill is precisely what stands in need of a defense - you can’t just assert that in the first premise of you argument (not if you hope to give a good argument, anyways).

It’s not just pro-choice people like me who think this. The foremost pro-life philosopher - the eminent Don Marquis - makes the same point in his article “Why Abortion is Immoral”:


“It is prima facie seriously wrong to kill a human being," or one of its variants, can be objected to on the grounds of ambiguity. If 'human being' is taken to be a biological category, then the anti-abortionist is left with the problem of explaining why a merely biological category should make a moral difference. Why, it is asked, is it any more reasonable to base a moral conclusion on the number of chromosomes in one's cells than on the color of one's skin? If 'human being', on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is a human being cannot be taken to be a premise in the anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely what needs to be established. Hence, either the anti-abortionist's main category is a morally irrelevant, merely biological category, or it is of no use to the anti-abortionist in establishing (noncircularly, of course) that abortion is wrong.”

Either “human being” refers to a mere biological category, in which case the fact that the fetus is a “human being” is not morally significant, or “human being” refers to a substantive moral category (persons), in which case claiming that fetuses are “human beings” is just to assert the very point at issue - that fetuses belong to a class of beings whom it is seriously wrong to kill. We want to know why fetuses belong to one of these substantive moral categories. You can’t just assert that they so belong in the first premise of your argument. This is the fundamental problem with the “innocent human being” argument against abortion.


Finally, the first premise of the argument - that it’s always wrong to kill an innocent human being - is false. Imagine that a villain mind controls a random person on the street to kill me. Let’s suppose the only way to save my own life against this battery is to kill the mind-controlled person. It would not be wrong for me to kill this mind-controlled person even though they would certainly be an innocent human being.

This is why Don Marquis presented the “anti-abortionist’s” principle as the claim that that it’s always prima facie wrong to to kill a human being. The word prima-facie has been used in many different ways by philosophers in a variety of fields, but in the domain of ethics, an action is usually taken to be “prima facie wrong” if it’s wrong unless a countervailing moral reason is present. For example - stealing is prima facie wrong. If I steal your cash for fun, that’s wrong. If I steal some of your cash to save my family from a life of slavery, I haven’t acted wrongly because in that case a strong countervailing moral reason is present.

Sometimes people get confused and interpret the word “prima facie” as meaning “typically” or “most of the time”. On this sense of “prima facie”, a prima facie wrong action would just be an action that is wrong most of the time. These people will revise the argument under consideration to something like this:

P1: It is prima facie (usually) wrong to kill innocent human beings.

P2: Abortion kills an innocent human being.

C: Therefore, abortion is prima facie (usually) wrong.

This is invalid. To see why, look at this argument:

P1: Stealing is prima facie (usually) wrong.

P2: Stealing a small amount of money in order to save your family from being tortured is an instance of stealing.

C: Therefore, stealing a small amount of money in order to save your family from being tortured is prima facie (usually) wrong.

Obviously, stealing a small amount of money to prevent your family from being tortured is not usually wrong just because stealing is usually wrong. The same thing can be said of the innocent human being argument. You’ll want to replace this “typically” version of prima facie with the “countervailing” version I mentioned above. That version fails for the reasons discussed earlier, however.

3 - Why Is This Argument So Popular?


Whenever a polysemous term is introduced into ethical discussions, it is all too easy to unknowingly slide between the different meanings assigned to that term in ordinary discussions, and to confuse the substantive moral uses of that term with the merely descriptive ones. The contentious moral use of the term is thereby disguised by an appeal to the uncontroversial descriptive use, subverting our attempts to discuss the heart of the issue. The terms “innocent” and “human being” prime us to think of beings like babies and children. This, taken, together with the polysemous nature of these terms, make a poor and controversial argument appear to be impenetrable and self-evident.

What’s more, it takes inordinately more time and effort to explain where the argument goes wrong than it does to spout the argument in the first place. In my experience talking with pro-life folks, most of them notice this and assume that because the explanation of why the argument is unsound is longer and more complicated than the argument itself, the pro-choice person must be desperate to find something wrong with this argument and is just throwing shit at the wall to see what sticks instead of developing a principled objection. That mindset itself is quite naive; it usually takes longer to explain why an argument fails than to actually recite that same argument verbally, but that’s just how some people think.

Hopefully, this argument will one day outlive its popularity, and the mainstream abortion debate will move closer to the questions we really care about.