ChatGPT: Please explain the objection to Don Marquis's argument against abortion that beginning fetuses do not have a "future like ours".

ChatGPT: Please explain the objection to Don Marquis's argument against abortion that beginning fetuses do not have a "future like ours".

Don Marquis's argument against abortion is based on the claim that killing a fetus is wrong because it deprives the fetus of a "future like ours" (FLO)—a future of value, including experiences, activities, and enjoyments it would otherwise have. One objection to this argument is that beginning fetuses (e.g., zygotes or embryos) do not yet have the necessary characteristics to make it meaningful to say they possess such a future.

Key Points of the Objection

1. Lack of Developed Mental Capacities: Critics argue that the concept of a "future like ours" presupposes certain mental capacities, such as consciousness, self-awareness, or the ability to value or anticipate a future. Beginning fetuses lack these capacities entirely, so it is not clear that they "have" a future in the morally relevant sense. Without any awareness or connection to that future, it may not be meaningful to claim they are being deprived of it.

2. Contingency of Development: Another aspect of the objection is that beginning fetuses have only the potential for a future like ours, not an actual one. Their development into beings capable of having such a future is contingent on numerous factors, including continued gestation in favorable conditions. Since this potential is not guaranteed, critics claim it does not confer the moral weight Marquis attributes to it.

3. Difference Between Actual and Potential Futures: Critics might distinguish between the actual future of a person (which is rooted in current mental capacities and identity) and the merely potential future of a beginning fetus. They argue that it is morally significant to deprive someone of an actual future but less so to prevent the realization of a merely potential one.

4. Parity with Non-Human Entities: Some critics point out that many non-human entities, such as animals or fertilized eggs outside a womb, also have potential futures involving valuable experiences. If Marquis’s argument hinges solely on the potential for a future of value, it could lead to counterintuitive conclusions, such as granting moral consideration to all these entities, which most people do not find compelling.

5. Personal Identity Concerns: There is also a philosophical concern about whether the early fetus can be considered the "same" entity as the person it might become. If personal identity over time depends on continuity of mental states or other features absent in early development, then the fetus does not yet have a "future like ours" in a morally relevant sense because it is not yet "us."

This objection highlights a critical challenge for Marquis's argument: whether the possession of a potential future is sufficient to ground the moral wrongness of abortion or whether other factors, such as the presence of mental capacities or actual identity, are necessary for the argument to hold.