Comments on The Great Unborn Wall

Someone asked for a response to this, so here is a quick one. Responses are in text beginning with ###

The Great Unborn Wall

@greatunbornwall

A very interesting and intriguing question. People who are both non-religious (agnostic or atheist) and pro-life typically arrive at their position through one or more of the following perspectives: 1. Science & Biology Many atheists and agnostics believe that human life begins at conception based on biological principles.

### Yes, but EVERYONE understands that mammalian bodies start at conception or soon after. This does not support some kind of anti-abortion conclusion, for many reasons. 

From the moment of fertilization, a unique human organism with its own DNA exists, growing and developing through all the stages of human life.

### Yes, but EVERYONE understands that.

If personhood is based on human biology rather than religious or philosophical ideas, then abortion is seen as the destruction of a human life.

### No, personhood is not "based on human biology." Random human skin cells have human biology: they are not persons. 

We know that we are biologically human organisms: the question then is what makes biologically human organisms like us persons? The answer "that we are biologically human organisms" is not an informative answer. 

In thinking about whether AI will ever be a person, we are not thinking about whether it will be biologically human. 

There are or could be non-human persons: non-humans could  exist that fit the concept of "person."

Here are some thinking activities to think about what persons are:

We might begin by thinking about what makes us persons. Consider this:

We are persons now. Either we will always be persons or we will cease being persons. If we will cease to be persons, what can end our personhood? If we will always be persons, how could that be?

Both options yield insight into personhood. Many people think that their personhood ends at death or if they were to go into a permanent coma: their body is (biologically) alive but the person is gone: that is why other people are sad. And if we continue to exist after the death of our bodies, as some religions maintain, what continues to exist? The person, perhaps even without a body, some think! Both responses suggest that personhood is defined by a rough and vague set of psychological or mental, rational and emotional characteristics: consciousness, knowledge, memories, and ways of communicating, all psychologically unified by a unique personality.

A second activity supports this understanding:

Make a list of things that are definitely not persons. Make a list of individuals who definitely are persons. Make a list of imaginary or fictional personified beings which, if existed, would be persons: these beings that fit or display the concept of person, even if they don’t exist. What explains the patterns of the lists?

Rocks, carrots, cups and dead gnats are clearly not persons. We are persons. Science fiction gives us ideas of personified beings: to give something the traits of a person is to indicate what the traits of persons are, so personified beings give insights into what it is to be a person. Even though the non-human characters from, say, Star Wars don’t exist, they fit the concept of person: we could befriend them, work with them, and so on, and we could only do that with persons. A common idea of God is that of an immaterial person who has exceptional power, knowledge, and goodness: you couldn’t pray to a rock and hope that rock would respond: you could only pray to a person. Are conscious and feeling animals, like chimpanzees, dolphins, cats, dogs, chickens, pigs, and cows more relevantly like us, as persons, or are they more like rocks and cabbages, non-persons? Conscious and feeling animals seem to be closer to persons than not.^[13] So, this classificatory and explanatory activity further supports a psychological understanding of personhood: persons are, at root, conscious, aware and feeling beings.

2. Human Rights & Consistency Some argue that human rights should be universal, applying to all humans regardless of their stage of development. They see abortion as a violation of the right to life, just as they might oppose killing newborns, the disabled, or the elderly. A consistent human rights perspective—especially one rooted in concepts like bodily autonomy, non-aggression, and protecting the vulnerable—can lead someone to be pro-life. 

### No leading or plausible theory of human rights proposes that we have rights simply because we are biologically human: such a theory implies a living human toe has rights.  

No leading or plausible theory of human rights proposes that we have rights simply because we are biologically human organisms. 

Theories based on ideas from Mill, Kant, Locke, Hobbes, Rawls and pretty much all other historically influential thinkers propose, ultimately, that we have rights because of characteristics that relate to us having minds or being conscious beings:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/#JustForHumaRigh

 3. Secular Ethics & Moral Philosophy Some pro-life atheists adopt secular moral frameworks, such as utilitarianism or deontological ethics, to argue against abortion. For example: Utilitarianism: They may argue that abortion causes harm not only to the unborn child but also to society, diminishing respect for life. Deontological Ethics: A principle-based approach may assert that killing an innocent human is always wrong, regardless of circumstances. 

### Interestingly, no leading ethical theory in any way obviously condemns early abortions. Utilitarianism doesn't, since it's focus is on sentient beings. Kant's ethics doesn't: it's focus is on rational beings. Rawls' theory of justice doesn't. Really, no theory does. 

The claim (which is not a "moral framework") that "killing an innocent human is always wrong, regardless of circumstances" is either false or just not applicable to cases of early abortion, for many reasons. 

 4. Concern for Exploitation & Social Justice Some non-religious pro-lifers, especially feminists and progressives, argue that abortion is often a symptom of societal failures—poverty, lack of support for mothers, and male irresponsibility. They see abortion as a way that the powerful (governments, corporations, or irresponsible partners) avoid responsibility rather than addressing the needs of women and children. 

### These "progressive soundbites" don't fit the case, despite sounding good to people who want to hear them. And they involve just assuming that abortion is wrong or "begging the question." See here: https://www.abortionarguments.com/2020/11/abortion-and-soundbites-why-pro-choice.html 

Pro-Life Soundbites

Abortion is wrong because:

• fetuses are human or human beings.
• human beings have rights.
• human rights protect all humans.
• we should advocate for equality, including equality for unborn human beings.
• abortion ends a life.
• abortion is killing.

These soundbites can sound good because human beings are generally wrong to kill; human rights do protect human beings; human rights apply to all humans; equality is a good thing; and ending lives and killing are often wrong. Denying these things often results in silly assertions: that fetuses in human women aren’t human or aren’t alive, or that abortion doesn’t involve killing, etc.

That these soundbites are based on what seems to be common sense can make these simple cases against abortion seem strong. [See the link for why these are deceptive!]

 5. Personal Experience Some atheists and agnostics who once supported abortion changed their minds after experiencing it firsthand—whether as fathers who lost their children to abortion, former abortion workers who saw what happens inside clinics, or women who felt deep regret after an abortion. Their shift is often based on emotional and ethical reflection rather than religious beliefs. What are your thoughts? Thanks again for such an interesting and intriguing question.

### OK, sure, but people have the "opposite" personal experiences also, and they also sometimes actually rigorously study the issues too and come to contrary conclusions! 

Are embryos and early fetuses "innocent" (again)?

It's common for anti-abortion advocates to claim that embryos and early fetuses are "innocent."

In an article by a co-author and me, "Why the case against abortion is weak, ethically speaking," we argued this is false: embryos and early fetuses are neither innocent nor not innocent, and so they are not innocent (and they are not "guilty" either!).

This is because only beings who make decisions, or perform actions--ideally actions that can be ethical or not--can be innocent, and embryos and early fetuses aren't that. 

Here's what we said:

. . calling fetuses "innocent" assumes that they are persons: "innocence" implies the potential for guilt, and that's only true of persons. Nobody would refer to human eggs or tissue as "innocent," because nobody thinks these things are persons. And for someone to have a potential future seems to require that "someone" be a person: for any future to be someone's future, there must be a person whose future that belongs to. So are fetuses persons? 

"Personhood" is a controversial concept, but the organ donation and anencephaly cases can help us understand it. First, we should all agree that it's usually wrong to end the lives of persons: persons have the right to life. But since organ donation practices and how anencephalic newborns are treated is not wrong, we can conclude that these human beings are not persons: if they were persons, ending their lives would be wrong. And these humans are not persons because, again, they lack brains capable of supporting any type of consciousness: they were persons in cases of organ donation and cannot be persons in cases of anencephaly. And this suggests that beginning fetuses are not persons either, since they too lack consciousness-enabling brains. So the pro-life claim that all embryos and fetuses are persons is not true. 

Many people (online) have unreflectively responded to this, claiming that embryos and early fetuses are indeed innocent, since they haven't done anything wrong. 

Yes, while it's true that they haven't done anything wrong, rocks and plants haven't done anything wrong either. Yet they are not innocent. 

So this (again) suggests this:

A is "innocent" if and only if: 

(1) A could do something wrong and 

(2) A does not do anything wrong. 

Again, embryos and early fetuses don't meet condition (1) here.

I recently saw that an anonymous person - a "Golprey Predork" - has written a response to what we've argued here. (He earlier wrote an [unsuccessful] response to my arguments that nobody must agree that embryos and beginning fetuses are babies or children.)

He observes that it's common for people to call embryos and early fetuses "innocent." Sure, but the masses honestly haven't thought about this much--that they often support their claim with an argument that entails that rocks are innocent suggests that--and the masses can be wrong. 

Ironically, he appeals to philosopher Tom Regan. This is ironic because Regan was a good friend of mine: his views and arguments have been very influential to me and he, as a person, was very supportive and encouraging of me. Regan was a great person, and I miss him. 

But, while Regan was a great philosopher, he wasn't perfect. He made some mistakes that I have written about in a number of places, such as Xenotransplantation, Subsistence Hunting and the Pursuit of Health: Lessons for Animal Rights-Based Vegan Advocacy and Tom Regan on ‘Kind’ Arguments Against Animal Rights and For Human Rights, at least. 

And here I think Regan makes some mistakes, and so does"Golprey in appealing to him. Here's what Golprey writes and reports:

Even some philosophers claim that “animals and infants constitute paradigmatic cases of innocence and vulnerability” (Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics, 5). For this very reason, Tom Regan maintains, “it would be arbitrary in the extreme stipulatively to confine talk of who is ‘innocent’ only to moral agents” (The Case for Animal Rights, 295).

While Regan agrees that something can be innocent if it is a moral agent, he also argues that innocence applies to moral patients—beings incapable of moral agency but still deserving of moral consideration. For Regan, moral patients are innocent when they are treated unjustly without having done anything to deserve such treatment. Addressing those who, like Nobis and Dudley, argue that moral patients cannot be innocent, Regan states: “The inability of moral patients to do anything that merits treatment prima facie violative of their rights does not show that they cannot be innocent. On the contrary, what this shows is that, unlike human moral agents, they cannot be anything but innocent” (295, italics in original).

Regan’s understanding of innocence better reflects how the concept is used in everyday moral discourse, making it preferable to Nobis and Dudley's view. 

The context here suggests that Regan is discussing whether animals can do anything to deserve to be treated badly--can they be "guilty" and thus deserving of some kind of ill-treatment or punishment? 

Here are two screenshots from Golprey:

And here's the whole page:

So Regan observes that, of course, animals can't be guilty of anything and so deserving of ill-treatment or punishment. And animals are not guilty: it's it not the case that they are guilty. 

The denial though, of, guilty isn't "innocent": it's not guilty. So Regan might be thinking that the options here are that, for anything, it's either guilty or innocent, overlooking that another option is "neither innocent nor not" or "neither innocent or guilty nor not."

Maybe Regan overlooks this because he thinks this:

• a being is deserving of good-treatment (a contrast to ill-treatment) only if it's innocent. 

• So if a being S is deserving of good-treatment (and not any deserved punishment), then S is innocent.

But we need not agree: we can think this:

• a being is deserving of good-treatment (a contrast to ill-treatment) only if it is not guilty. 

• So if a being S is deserving of good-treatment (and not any deserved punishment), then S is not guilty.

Animals are indeed not guilty--it is not the case that they are guilty--and that's consistent with them not being deserving of ill-treatment. So, if Regan thinks that it's somehow important for the case for animal rights that they be "innocent," that appears to be mistaken: we need not think that. 

(Setting that aside, whatabout a "vicious" dog who, for whatever reason, often attacks people and so is dangerous, and so many people think must be killed for the safety of others? Many people who call other animals--animals who are safe to others--"innocent" would not describe this dog as "innocent" since this dog has done things that are dangerous: again, this suggests that innocence requires the ability to do things, which dogs have. But, insofar as this dog's bad behavior was, presumably, not due to some kind of conscious choices on the dogs part, many would say the dog is an "innocent" victim here--the dog didn't choose anything that lead to his or her dangerous disposition: yet, despite being "innocent" in this sense, can still be killed for the sake of others' safety. Recall that rights are, according to Regan, prima facie in nature: they can be overriden; so here the dog is an innocent treat that can be permissibly killed.).

One interesting thing, however, is that it does not appear that Regan would consider an embryo or beginning fetus a "moral patient" anyway, as they are beings that have never been conscious and so have no experiential welfare, and so cannot have anything else, or do anything else, that depends on that, such as behave or act, as Regan mentions. So even if moral patients can be innocent, that doesn't suggest that beings that are not moral patients or moral agents can be innocent, or that they are:

So, in sum, Golprey Predork's objection is not very good, again.

And some previous posts on this:

Are embryos and beginning fetuses "innocent"?

'. . calling fetuses "innocent" assumes that they are persons: "innocence" implies the potential for guilt, and that's only true of persons. Nobody would refer to human eggs or tissue as "innocent," because nobody thinks these things are persons.' [update: this is from our AWARD WINNING essay!] 

Further discussion here on what kinds of things can be "innocent":

To be "innocent" something must (A) be able to do wrong and not do it or (B) to not have done anything wrong?

What's the better definition? Why?

Is there a better definition?

— Nathan Nobis . com (@NathanNobis) November 23, 2022